股权激励计划和董事会对股权授予的自由裁量权

IF 4.9 2区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2024-03-12 DOI:10.1111/1475-679X.12532
BRIAN CADMAN, RICHARD CARRIZOSA
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引用次数: 0

摘要

股权薪酬是根据股权激励计划发放的,该计划必须得到股东的批准,并将股权授予的自由裁量权交给董事会。我们预测并发现,当公司面临更大的劳动力市场力量和更不稳定的股票回报时,股权计划提案会赋予董事会更大的授予自由裁量权。在研究投票时,我们发现股东不太可能支持具有异常自由裁量权的计划。我们还发现,自由裁量权更大的董事会会在股价下跌时授予更多股权。最后,我们发现,当董事会授予股权的能力受到可用股份池较小的限制时,以及当董事会计划增加股权授予时,他们会要求额外的股份。总之,我们的研究结果阐明了公司如何在应对劳动力市场压力和动荡经营环境的需求与股东治理和股权薪酬监督之间取得平衡。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。

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Equity Incentive Plans and Board of Director Discretion over Equity Grants

Equity compensation is granted out of an equity incentive plan that must be approved by shareholders and cedes discretion over equity grants to boards of directors. We predict and find that equity plan proposals give boards more discretion over grants when the firm faces greater labor market forces and more volatile stock returns. When examining votes, we find that shareholders are less likely to support plans with abnormal discretion. We also find that boards with more discretion grant more equity in response to stock price declines. Lastly, we find that boards request additional shares when their ability to grant equity is more constrained by a smaller pool of available shares, and when they plan to increase equity grants. Overall our findings illuminate how firms balance needs to respond to labor market pressure and volatile operating environments against shareholder governance and oversight of equity compensation.

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来源期刊
Journal of Accounting Research
Journal of Accounting Research BUSINESS, FINANCE-
CiteScore
7.80
自引率
6.80%
发文量
53
期刊介绍: The Journal of Accounting Research is a general-interest accounting journal. It publishes original research in all areas of accounting and related fields that utilizes tools from basic disciplines such as economics, statistics, psychology, and sociology. This research typically uses analytical, empirical archival, experimental, and field study methods and addresses economic questions, external and internal, in accounting, auditing, disclosure, financial reporting, taxation, and information as well as related fields such as corporate finance, investments, capital markets, law, contracting, and information economics.
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