大流行中无恐慌:个人选择对公共卫生政策的影响

Miao Bai, Ying Cui, Guangwen Kong, Anthony Zhenhuan Zhang
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摘要

问题定义:社会隔离和封锁等公共卫生干预措施在遏制 2019 年冠状病毒病(COVID-19)等传染病爆发方面发挥着重要作用。然而,由于正常的社会经济活动受到干扰,这些干预措施可能会造成巨大的经济损失。此外,个人的活动水平不仅会受到公共卫生政策的影响,还会受到个人对感染疾病负担的看法的影响。需要进行战略规划,通过考虑个人的反应来优化这些公共卫生干预措施的时间和强度。方法/结果:我们使用多项式对数选择模型来描述个人对感染风险和公共卫生干预措施的反应,并将其整合到具有易感者-感染者-康复者疾病传播动态的重复斯塔克尔伯格博弈中。我们发现,由于个人不了解强加给他人的负外部性,因此个人均衡活动水平高于社会最优活动水平。因此,与在疾病流行高峰时实施封锁和社会疏远政策相比,在疾病流行程度适中时实施封锁和社会疏远政策可能同样关键,甚至更关键。为了验证这些发现,我们根据明尼苏达州具有代表性的 COVID-19 数据进行了数值研究。管理意义:我们的研究结果呼吁政策制定者在规划不同的大流行遏制措施时注意考虑个人反应的影响。个人在大流行中的反应可能会极大地影响封锁和社会疏远政策的最佳实施:在线附录可在 https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2022.0514 上查阅。
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No Panic in Pandemic: The Impact of Individual Choice on Public Health Policy
Problem definition: Public health interventions, such as social distancing and lockdown, play an important role in containing infectious disease outbreaks, such as coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19). Yet, these interventions could cause significant financial losses because of the disruption to regular socioeconomic activities. Moreover, an individual’s activity level is influenced not only by public health policies but also by one’s perception of the disease burden of infection. Strategic planning is required to optimize the timing and intensity of these public health interventions by considering individual responses. Methodology/results: We use the multinomial logit choice model to characterize individual reactions to the risk of infection and public health interventions and integrate it into a repeated Stackelberg game with the susceptible-infected-recovered disease transmission dynamics. We find that the individual equilibrium activity level is higher than the socially optimal activity level because of an individual’s ignorance of the negative externality imposed on others. As a result, implementing lockdown and social distancing policies at moderate disease prevalence may be equivalently critical, if not more, compared with their implementations when the disease prevalence is at its peak level. To verify these findings, we conduct numerical studies based on representative COVID-19 data in Minnesota. Managerial implications: Our results call for policymakers’ attention to consider the impact of individuals’ responses in the planning for different pandemic containment measures. Individuals’ responses in the pandemic may significantly affect the optimal implementation of lockdown and social distancing policies.Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2022.0514 .
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