{"title":"投票支持贸易保护主义政党:来自九次欧洲社会调查的证据","authors":"Enrique García-Viñuela, Nicolas Motz, Pedro Riera","doi":"10.1177/14651165241237611","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This article empirically investigates the impact of globalization on voting behavior. Specifically, combining individual-level data from the first nine waves of the European Social Survey, party-level information from the Comparative Manifesto Project, and country-level data from Eurostat, we study the individual determinants of the vote for trade protectionist parties. Our findings show, firstly, that protectionist parties mainly receive electoral support from less-educated voters, unemployed individuals, and members of labor unions. Secondly, we test the compensation principle using a macro measure of a country's compensation potential and find, contrary to expectations, no significant evidence that a greater potential to mitigate the labor market adjustment costs resulting from economic openness deters the propensity to vote for protectionist parties in national elections.","PeriodicalId":505735,"journal":{"name":"European Union Politics","volume":"16 5","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2024-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Voting for trade protectionist parties: Evidence from nine waves of the European Social Survey\",\"authors\":\"Enrique García-Viñuela, Nicolas Motz, Pedro Riera\",\"doi\":\"10.1177/14651165241237611\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This article empirically investigates the impact of globalization on voting behavior. Specifically, combining individual-level data from the first nine waves of the European Social Survey, party-level information from the Comparative Manifesto Project, and country-level data from Eurostat, we study the individual determinants of the vote for trade protectionist parties. Our findings show, firstly, that protectionist parties mainly receive electoral support from less-educated voters, unemployed individuals, and members of labor unions. Secondly, we test the compensation principle using a macro measure of a country's compensation potential and find, contrary to expectations, no significant evidence that a greater potential to mitigate the labor market adjustment costs resulting from economic openness deters the propensity to vote for protectionist parties in national elections.\",\"PeriodicalId\":505735,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"European Union Politics\",\"volume\":\"16 5\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-03-15\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"European Union Politics\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1177/14651165241237611\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"European Union Politics","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1177/14651165241237611","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Voting for trade protectionist parties: Evidence from nine waves of the European Social Survey
This article empirically investigates the impact of globalization on voting behavior. Specifically, combining individual-level data from the first nine waves of the European Social Survey, party-level information from the Comparative Manifesto Project, and country-level data from Eurostat, we study the individual determinants of the vote for trade protectionist parties. Our findings show, firstly, that protectionist parties mainly receive electoral support from less-educated voters, unemployed individuals, and members of labor unions. Secondly, we test the compensation principle using a macro measure of a country's compensation potential and find, contrary to expectations, no significant evidence that a greater potential to mitigate the labor market adjustment costs resulting from economic openness deters the propensity to vote for protectionist parties in national elections.