Ana Albuquerque, Rui Albuquerque, Mary Ellen Carter, Qi Dong
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引用次数: 0
摘要
我们估算了与 CEO 激励薪酬相关的薪酬溢价。利用明确详细的美国首席执行官薪酬合同数据和模拟分析，我们发现，薪酬待遇风险较高的首席执行官获得的风险薪酬溢价占总薪酬的 13.5%。该溢价与首席执行官风险规避的代用指标呈正相关，但隐含的风险规避值表明，该溢价在经济上小于之前研究的结果。我们使用各种衡量薪酬方差的代用指标进行了测试，发现了薪酬风险溢价在经济上较小的一致证据。这些结果与最近的研究结果一致，即风险对薪酬水平的影响可能比以前认为的更有限。数据可用性：数据可从文中引用的公共来源获得。JEL 分类：D81; G30; J33.
How Large Is the Pay Premium from Executive Incentive Compensation?
We estimate the pay premium associated with CEO incentive compensation. Using explicit detailed U.S. CEO compensation contract data and simulation analysis, we find that CEOs with riskier pay packages receive a premium for pay at risk that represents 13.5 percent of total pay. The premium is positively correlated with proxies for CEO risk aversion, but implied risk aversion values suggest that the premium is economically smaller than suggested by prior studies. We perform our tests using a variety of proxies to measure the variance of pay and find consistent evidence of economically small pay risk premiums. These results are consistent with recent findings suggesting that risk may have a more limited influence over the level of pay than previously thought.
Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.
JEL Classifications: D81; G30; J33.
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