共同基金家族的投资组合抽水

IF 10.4 1区 经济学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE Journal of Financial Economics Pub Date : 2024-04-15 DOI:10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103839
Pingle Wang
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文研究了基金家族层面的投资组合抽水,即非明星基金经理策略性地购买家族中明星基金持有的股票,以夸大其季度末业绩。2002 年,美国证券交易委员会加强了对投资组合抽水的监管,此后,从事此类活动的明星基金表现出了虚高的业绩。被该策略抽走的股票在季度末出现强劲反转。此外,尽管因投资组合配置不当而导致业绩略微不佳,但为明星基金抽血的非明星基金经理却获得了异常高的后续资金流,这表明存在家族补贴模式。
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Portfolio pumping in mutual fund families

This paper investigates portfolio pumping at the fund family level, where non-star fund managers strategically purchase stocks held by star funds in the family to inflate their quarter-end performance. Star funds that engage in such activities show inflated performance after 2002 when the Securities and Exchange Commission increased regulation on portfolio pumping. Stocks pumped by the strategy show strong reversals at the quarter end. Moreover, despite a minor underperformance stemming from portfolio misallocation, non-star fund managers pumping for star funds receive abnormally high subsequent flows, suggesting a pattern of family subsidization.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
15.80
自引率
4.50%
发文量
192
审稿时长
37 days
期刊介绍: The Journal of Financial Economics provides a specialized forum for the publication of research in the area of financial economics and the theory of the firm, placing primary emphasis on the highest quality analytical, empirical, and clinical contributions in the following major areas: capital markets, financial institutions, corporate finance, corporate governance, and the economics of organizations.
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