{"title":"理解第一个 Paralogism:友好的分歧","authors":"Patricia Kitcher","doi":"10.1017/s1369415424000128","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"My comments focus on Proops’s treatment of the Paralogisms. I agree with many aspects of his discussion, including his views about the project of Rational Psychology and his analyses of how, exactly, the arguments of the Paralogisms are defective in form, but I disagree with his interpretation of the First Paralogism. I argue that the source of confusion that Kant diagnoses is not the grammatical distribution of ‘I’ as singular, but the fact that the I-representation is both empty and necessary for cognition.","PeriodicalId":54140,"journal":{"name":"Kantian Review","volume":"38 3 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1000,"publicationDate":"2024-04-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Understanding the First Paralogism: A Friendly Disagreement\",\"authors\":\"Patricia Kitcher\",\"doi\":\"10.1017/s1369415424000128\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"My comments focus on Proops’s treatment of the Paralogisms. I agree with many aspects of his discussion, including his views about the project of Rational Psychology and his analyses of how, exactly, the arguments of the Paralogisms are defective in form, but I disagree with his interpretation of the First Paralogism. I argue that the source of confusion that Kant diagnoses is not the grammatical distribution of ‘I’ as singular, but the fact that the I-representation is both empty and necessary for cognition.\",\"PeriodicalId\":54140,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Kantian Review\",\"volume\":\"38 3 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.1000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-04-04\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Kantian Review\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1017/s1369415424000128\",\"RegionNum\":2,\"RegionCategory\":\"哲学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"0\",\"JCRName\":\"PHILOSOPHY\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Kantian Review","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s1369415424000128","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
Understanding the First Paralogism: A Friendly Disagreement
My comments focus on Proops’s treatment of the Paralogisms. I agree with many aspects of his discussion, including his views about the project of Rational Psychology and his analyses of how, exactly, the arguments of the Paralogisms are defective in form, but I disagree with his interpretation of the First Paralogism. I argue that the source of confusion that Kant diagnoses is not the grammatical distribution of ‘I’ as singular, but the fact that the I-representation is both empty and necessary for cognition.
期刊介绍:
The journal aims to publish the best contemporary work on Kant and Kantian issues and places an emphasis on those current philosophical debates which reflect a Kantian influence. Almost all recent Western philosophy makes some reference to the work of Kant, either consciously rejecting or consciously endorsing some aspect of that work. In epistemology, in philosophy of mind and language, in moral and political philosophy, and in aesthetics, such Kantian influences are widely acknowledged and extensively discussed. Kant"s work has also increasingly become a concern for the social and political sciences. The journal strengthens this interest both by establishing interpretations of Kant"s own writing and by discussing the substance of the related current philosophical debates.