合并指南的演变:这只狐狸是不是太聪明了?

IF 0.8 4区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS Review of Industrial Organization Pub Date : 2024-04-06 DOI:10.1007/s11151-024-09956-y
Carl Shapiro
{"title":"合并指南的演变:这只狐狸是不是太聪明了?","authors":"Carl Shapiro","doi":"10.1007/s11151-024-09956-y","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>The 2023 Merger Guidelines make some notable improvements over the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines. They give greater emphasis to the idea that predicting the competitive effects of a proposed merger is inherently difficult and that to block a merger the government need only show a risk that the merger may substantially lessen competition – not that it will do so. They also give greater emphasis to dynamic competition and innovation – especially with regard to acquisitions of potential entrants – and they add useful material on multi-sided platforms. However, the treatment of market definition in the 2023 Merger Guidelines may weaken horizontal merger enforcement by demoting the role of the “hypothetical monopolist test,” which is used to define markets for the purpose of measuring market shares, and by removing extensive material from prior guidelines that explained why market shares measured in narrower markets tend to be more informative than market shares measured in broader markets. The 2023 Merger Guidelines lower the market concentration thresholds that trigger a presumption by the antitrust enforcement agencies that a merger may substantially lessen competition, but the enforcement data suggest that change will have little effect in practice. The 2023 Merger Guidelines also may lead to less effective deterrence of harmful mergers because they are not well targeted at the mergers that are most likely to substantially lessen competition. One cannot prioritize everything.</p>","PeriodicalId":47454,"journal":{"name":"Review of Industrial Organization","volume":"6 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8000,"publicationDate":"2024-04-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Evolution of the Merger Guidelines: Is This Fox Too Clever by Half?\",\"authors\":\"Carl Shapiro\",\"doi\":\"10.1007/s11151-024-09956-y\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p>The 2023 Merger Guidelines make some notable improvements over the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines. They give greater emphasis to the idea that predicting the competitive effects of a proposed merger is inherently difficult and that to block a merger the government need only show a risk that the merger may substantially lessen competition – not that it will do so. They also give greater emphasis to dynamic competition and innovation – especially with regard to acquisitions of potential entrants – and they add useful material on multi-sided platforms. However, the treatment of market definition in the 2023 Merger Guidelines may weaken horizontal merger enforcement by demoting the role of the “hypothetical monopolist test,” which is used to define markets for the purpose of measuring market shares, and by removing extensive material from prior guidelines that explained why market shares measured in narrower markets tend to be more informative than market shares measured in broader markets. The 2023 Merger Guidelines lower the market concentration thresholds that trigger a presumption by the antitrust enforcement agencies that a merger may substantially lessen competition, but the enforcement data suggest that change will have little effect in practice. The 2023 Merger Guidelines also may lead to less effective deterrence of harmful mergers because they are not well targeted at the mergers that are most likely to substantially lessen competition. One cannot prioritize everything.</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":47454,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Review of Industrial Organization\",\"volume\":\"6 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.8000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-04-06\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Review of Industrial Organization\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-024-09956-y\",\"RegionNum\":4,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q3\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Review of Industrial Organization","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-024-09956-y","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

摘要

与 2010 年《横向兼并指南》相比,《2023 年兼并指南》有了一些显著改进。它们更加强调预测拟议兼并的竞争影响本质上是困难的,要阻止兼并,政府只需证明兼并可能大幅削弱竞争的风险,而不是兼并一定会削弱竞争。它们还更加强调动态竞争和创新--尤其是关于潜在进入者的收购--并增加了关于多方平台的有用材料。然而,《2023 年兼并指南》对市场定义的处理可能会削弱横向兼并的执法力度,因为《2023 年兼并指南》贬低了 "假定垄断者测试 "的作用,而 "假定垄断者测试 "是用来定义市场以衡量市场份额的,《2023 年兼并指南》还删除了以前指南中的大量材料,这些材料解释了为什么在较窄市场中衡量的市场份额往往比在较宽市场中衡量的市场份额更有参考价值。2023 年《兼并指南》降低了市场集中度门槛,反垄断执法机构可据此推定兼并可能大幅削弱竞争,但执法数据表明,这一变化在实践中影响不大。2023 年《兼并指南》还可能导致对有害兼并的威慑效果大打折扣,因为它没有很好地针对最有可能大幅削弱竞争的兼并。我们不能把所有事情都放在首位。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。

摘要图片

查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
Evolution of the Merger Guidelines: Is This Fox Too Clever by Half?

The 2023 Merger Guidelines make some notable improvements over the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines. They give greater emphasis to the idea that predicting the competitive effects of a proposed merger is inherently difficult and that to block a merger the government need only show a risk that the merger may substantially lessen competition – not that it will do so. They also give greater emphasis to dynamic competition and innovation – especially with regard to acquisitions of potential entrants – and they add useful material on multi-sided platforms. However, the treatment of market definition in the 2023 Merger Guidelines may weaken horizontal merger enforcement by demoting the role of the “hypothetical monopolist test,” which is used to define markets for the purpose of measuring market shares, and by removing extensive material from prior guidelines that explained why market shares measured in narrower markets tend to be more informative than market shares measured in broader markets. The 2023 Merger Guidelines lower the market concentration thresholds that trigger a presumption by the antitrust enforcement agencies that a merger may substantially lessen competition, but the enforcement data suggest that change will have little effect in practice. The 2023 Merger Guidelines also may lead to less effective deterrence of harmful mergers because they are not well targeted at the mergers that are most likely to substantially lessen competition. One cannot prioritize everything.

求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
CiteScore
2.10
自引率
9.10%
发文量
35
期刊介绍: New Online Manuscript Submission System The Review of Industrial Organization publishes research papers on all aspects of industrial organization, broadly defined. A main focus is on competition and monopoly, in their many forms and processes and their effects on efficiency, innovation, and social conditions. Topics may range from the internal organization of enterprises to wide international comparisons. The Review is also increasing its interest in papers on public policies such as antitrust, regulation, deregulation, public enterprise, and privatization. Papers may deal with any economic sectors and any developed economies. The Review continues its primary interest in ideas that can be verified by econometric evidence, case studies, or other real conditions. But the Review also seeks papers that advance significant theories of industrial organization and policy. Papers using abstract techniques and econometric tests should present the methods and analysis in plain enough English so that non-specialist readers can evaluate the content. The Review welcomes submissions from any source, and the Editors will make every effort to have papers reviewed quickly and to give prompt decisions. The Editors will also seek to arrange symposia on specific topics, and they are open to proposals for grouped papers. They also welcome shorter notes and commentaries on topics of interest to the profession. Officially cited as: Rev Ind Organ
期刊最新文献
A Transactions Cost Analysis of the Welfare and Output Effects of Rebates and Non-Linear Pricing Cartel Damages Claims, Passing-On, and Passing-Back Location, Location, Quality:The Fixed Differentiation Principle The Coase Conjecture When the Monopolist and Customers have Different Discount Rates Heterogeneous Tax-Cut Pass-Through and Market Structure
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1