获取和留住客户的授权和薪酬信息披露策略

IF 1.8 Q3 MANAGEMENT Nankai Business Review International Pub Date : 2024-04-10 DOI:10.1108/nbri-03-2023-0030

Weiting Wang, Yi Liao, Jiacan Li

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引用次数: 0

摘要

本研究旨在通过设计薪酬信息披露机制来提高企业获取和保留客户的效率。本研究建立了一个委托获取和保留客户的风格化博弈论模型，重点研究企业如何选择委托和工资信息披露策略。当销售代理为风险中性时，企业应选择多代理（MA）委托并披露其工资信息。然而，当销售代理为风险厌恶型时，企业可以根据保留市场的不确定性，披露获取代理或多代理委托中两个代理的工资。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Delegation and salary information disclosure strategies of customer acquisition and retention

Purpose

The purpose of this study to improve the efficiency of customer acquisition and retention through the design of salary information disclosure mechanism.

Design/methodology/approach

This study develops a stylized game-theoretic model of delegating customer acquisition and retention, focusing on how firms choose delegation and wage information disclosure strategy.

Findings

The results confirm the necessity for enterprises to disclose salary information. When sales agents are risk neutral, firms should choose multi-agent (MA) delegation and disclose their wages. However, when agents are risk averse, firms may disclose the wages of acquisition agents or both agents in MA delegation, depending on the uncertainty of the retention market.

Originality/value

This paper contributes to the literature on delegation of customer acquisition and retention and demonstrates that salary disclosure can be used as a supplement to the incentive mechanism.

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来源期刊

Nankai Business Review International MANAGEMENT-

CiteScore

2.30

自引率

3.60%

发文量

期刊介绍： Nankai Business Review International (NBRI) provides insights in to the adaptation of American and European management theory in China, the differences and exchanges between Chinese and western management styles, the relationship between Chinese enterprises’ management practice and social evolution and showcases the development and evolution of management theories based on Chinese cultural characteristics. The journal provides research of interest to managers and entrepreneurs worldwide with an interest in China as well as research associations and scholars focusing on Chinese problems in business and management.