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引用次数: 0
摘要
迈克尔-斯图尔特（Michael T. Stuart）（2021 和 2022 年）提出，想象力是一种智力上的双重过程美德，由想象力1（由认知第一类过程支撑）和想象力2（由第二类过程支持）组成。本文探讨了认真对待这一观点的后果。它提出，想象力的双过程观点允许我们纳入美德认识论的最新见解，为想象力如何在认识论上可靠提供了一个全新的视角。论证的中心是一般可靠性（GR）和功能系统可靠性（FSR）之间的区别，例如与 Kengo Miyazono 和 Uko Tooming（2023 年）关于认识论生成性的论证有关的区别。此外，本文还声称，双过程德性论述使我们能够整合认识论和想象力文献中的大量研究成果。此外，它还提出了一种区分创造力和想象力美德的新方法，并提出了将想象力视为美德而非技能的理由。
The consequences of seeing imagination as a dual-process virtue
Michael T. Stuart (2021 and 2022) has proposed imagination as an intellectual dual-process virtue, consisting of imagination1 (underwritten by cognitive Type 1 processing) and imagination2 (supported by Type 2 processing). This paper investigates the consequences of taking such an account seriously. It proposes that the dual-process view of imagination allows us to incorporate recent insights from virtue epistemology, providing a fresh perspective on how imagination can be epistemically reliable. The argument centers on the distinction between General Reliability (GR) and Functional System Reliability (FSR), for example in relation to Kengo Miyazono and Uko Tooming's (2023) argument for epistemic generativity. Furthermore, the paper claims that the dual-process virtue account enables us to integrate a wide range of findings from the literature on epistemology and imagination. Moreover, it suggests a novel way to distinguish the virtues of creativity and imagination and presents a case for viewing imagination as a virtue rather than a skill.
期刊介绍：
Metaphilosophy publishes articles and reviews books stressing considerations about philosophy and particular schools, methods, or fields of philosophy. The intended scope is very broad: no method, field, or school is excluded.
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