{"title":"绿色债务市场的流动性和客户效应","authors":"Dion Bongaerts , Dirk Schoenmaker","doi":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2024.102582","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We jointly model green and regular bond markets. Green bonds can improve allocative efficiency and lower financing costs for green projects, but economies of scale, like liquidity fragmentation, may cause friction. Consequently, profitable and welfare-enhancing projects, green and brown, can be rationed in equilibrium. Rationing green projects happens with a shortage of climate investors, large non-monetary offsets, and/or costly fragmentation. Rationing regular projects can happen with a shortage of regular investors, but also with an abundance, when more profitable green projects crowd out regular ones. We propose an alternative security design that preserves green earmarking but prevents fragmentation.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":15525,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Corporate Finance","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":7.2000,"publicationDate":"2024-04-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0929119924000440/pdfft?md5=d46ef289ea57a407a9a1e7f118a3888c&pid=1-s2.0-S0929119924000440-main.pdf","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Liquidity and clientele effects in green debt markets\",\"authors\":\"Dion Bongaerts , Dirk Schoenmaker\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2024.102582\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><p>We jointly model green and regular bond markets. Green bonds can improve allocative efficiency and lower financing costs for green projects, but economies of scale, like liquidity fragmentation, may cause friction. Consequently, profitable and welfare-enhancing projects, green and brown, can be rationed in equilibrium. Rationing green projects happens with a shortage of climate investors, large non-monetary offsets, and/or costly fragmentation. Rationing regular projects can happen with a shortage of regular investors, but also with an abundance, when more profitable green projects crowd out regular ones. We propose an alternative security design that preserves green earmarking but prevents fragmentation.</p></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":15525,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Corporate Finance\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":7.2000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-04-12\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0929119924000440/pdfft?md5=d46ef289ea57a407a9a1e7f118a3888c&pid=1-s2.0-S0929119924000440-main.pdf\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Corporate Finance\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0929119924000440\",\"RegionNum\":1,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"BUSINESS, FINANCE\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Corporate Finance","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0929119924000440","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"BUSINESS, FINANCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
Liquidity and clientele effects in green debt markets
We jointly model green and regular bond markets. Green bonds can improve allocative efficiency and lower financing costs for green projects, but economies of scale, like liquidity fragmentation, may cause friction. Consequently, profitable and welfare-enhancing projects, green and brown, can be rationed in equilibrium. Rationing green projects happens with a shortage of climate investors, large non-monetary offsets, and/or costly fragmentation. Rationing regular projects can happen with a shortage of regular investors, but also with an abundance, when more profitable green projects crowd out regular ones. We propose an alternative security design that preserves green earmarking but prevents fragmentation.
期刊介绍：
The Journal of Corporate Finance aims to publish high quality, original manuscripts that analyze issues related to corporate finance. Contributions can be of a theoretical, empirical, or clinical nature. Topical areas of interest include, but are not limited to: financial structure, payout policies, corporate restructuring, financial contracts, corporate governance arrangements, the economics of organizations, the influence of legal structures, and international financial management. Papers that apply asset pricing and microstructure analysis to corporate finance issues are also welcome.
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