财产的多元性

IF 1.4 2区 社会学 Q1 LAW Oxford Journal of Legal Studies Pub Date : 2024-04-16 DOI:10.1093/ojls/gqae012
Luke Rostill
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引用次数: 0

摘要

在《财产权:詹姆斯-彭纳(James Penner)在《财产权:重新审视》(Property Rights: A Re-Examination)一书中回到并发展了他从事了近三十年的一个项目:用另一种观点--将财产视为一种统一的权利--来取代颇具影响力的财产 "权利束 "观点,他认为这种观点存在无可挽回的缺陷。在这篇评论文章中,我阐述并分析了彭纳理论的核心特征。我认为,彭纳的观点在其最初的版本中是三重一元论的:它将财产视为一种单一的权利,由单一的人类利益所证明,并受到单一的不干涉义务的保护。我将继续批判性地审视彭纳的一个核心观点--要理解财产,就必须理解财产的正当性。在此过程中,我追溯了彭纳的论述是如何演变的,并解释了某些改动是如何在解决某些问题的同时产生另一些问题的。
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The Pluralities of Property
In Property Rights: A Re-Examination, James Penner returns to and develops a project that he has been engaged in for nearly three decades: to replace the influential ‘bundle of rights’ picture of property, which he regards as irredeemably flawed, with an alternative account—one that regards property as a unified entitlement. In this review article, I expound and analyse the central features of Penner’s theory. I defend the view that, in its original iteration, Penner’s account was trebly monistic: it regarded property as a single entitlement justified by a single human interest and protected by a single duty of non-interference. I go on to critically examine one of Penner’s central ideas—that to understand property it is necessary to understand its justification. Along the way, I trace how Penner’s account has evolved and explain how certain alterations have put some problems to bed while generating others.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
2.50
自引率
8.30%
发文量
31
期刊介绍: The Oxford Journal of Legal Studies is published on behalf of the Faculty of Law in the University of Oxford. It is designed to encourage interest in all matters relating to law, with an emphasis on matters of theory and on broad issues arising from the relationship of law to other disciplines. No topic of legal interest is excluded from consideration. In addition to traditional questions of legal interest, the following are all within the purview of the journal: comparative and international law, the law of the European Community, legal history and philosophy, and interdisciplinary material in areas of relevance.
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