Evidentialism, justification, and knowledge‐first

This paper examines the relationship between evidentialism, knowledge‐first epistemology, (E=K) in particular, and justification. Evidentialism gives an account of justified belief in terms of evidence but is silent on the nature of evidence. Knowledge‐first tells us what evidence is but stands in need of an agreed account of justification. So each might be able to supply what the other lacks. I argue that the combination of evidentialism, (E=K), and some plausible principles leads to the scepticism familiar from the Agrippan trilemma. I develop an Evidentialist Knowledge‐First view of justification that avoids scepticism by rejecting the entailment of justification by knowledge. This combination turns out to have unpalatable consequences. Nonetheless, the process of reaching that conclusion teaches lessons both to the evidentialist (regarding what evidence could be) and to the knowledge‐firster (regarding what justification is).