需求不确定情况下民间体育旅游目的地的动态投资战略

Xinjiao Lv, Bowen Deng, Kui Deng
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摘要

更多的研究应有助于发现民俗体育旅游目的地(FSTD)项目的最优投资策略。因此,考虑到民俗体育旅游目的地投资的动态特征、公共运营商与私人运营商的分工合作模式以及消费者需求的不确定性,本文建立了民俗体育旅游目的地动态博弈模型。公共资本负责场馆等基础设施建设,私人资本负责餐饮、住宿等服务。为促进 FSTD 项目的发展,上级政府对公共投资进行补贴。消费者对该项目的需求受到两类资本规模、服务价格和质量以及需求不确定性等因素的影响。研究发现,补贴会导致公共投资数量和消费需求的增加,但私人部门的投资以及公共和私人项目的价格不受补贴影响;公共部门的净回报率随补贴率呈倒 U 型变化,但私人部门的净回报率则单调上升。需求扰动拉大了有补贴和无补贴情况下运营商净收益的差距。
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Dynamic investment strategies for a folk sports tourism destination  under uncertain demand
More research should shed light on discovering the optimal investment strategy for folk sports tourism destination (FSTD) projects. Therefore, in this paper, we develop a dynamic game model of FSTD considering the dynamic characteristics of FSTD investment, the mode of division of labor and cooperation between public and private operators, and the uncertainty of consumer demand. Public capital is responsible for constructing infrastructures such as venues, and private capital is responsible for services such as catering and accommodation. To promote the development of the FSTD project, the higher-level government subsidizes public investment. Consumer demand for the program is affected by factors such as the size of the two types of capital, the price and quality of services, and demand uncertainty. The study finds that the subsidy leads to an increase in the quantity of public investment and consumption demand, but private sector investment and the prices of both public and private projects are unaffected by the subsidy; the public sector's net return varies in an inverted U-shape with the rate of subsidy, but the private sector's net return rises monotonically. Demand disturbances widen the gap in the net returns of operators between the subsidized and unsubsidized scenarios.
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