边境碳调整对国际气候协议的政治影响

IF 5.5 3区 经济学 Q1 BUSINESS Journal of Environmental Economics and Management Pub Date : 2024-05-01 DOI:10.1016/j.jeem.2024.102979
Achim Hagen , Mark Schopf
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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们研究了工业游说对国家气候政策的影响,以及如果联盟国利用边界碳调整来保护国内生产者,国际环境协议的形成。我们发现,这种政治影响的效果关键取决于碳税收入的分配。如果碳税收入转移到家庭,游说就会向下扭曲碳税以减轻税负,并且不会影响联盟的规模。这将导致排放增加和福利降低。相反,如果将税收返还给企业,外来者国家的游说者会支持碳税,而联盟国家的游说者会支持碳补贴,以提高国际商品价格。这就缩小了国家间的税收差异和福利差异,从而减少了搭便车的动机。然后,如果政治影响力足够大,游说就会稳定大联盟,与没有游说的 "完美 "世界相比,全球排放量就会减少。
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Political influence on international climate agreements with border carbon adjustment

We study the influence of industrial lobbying on national climate policies and the formation of an international environmental agreement if the coalition countries use border carbon adjustments to protect domestic producers. We find that the effects of this political influence crucially depend on the distribution of carbon tax revenues. If these are transferred to the households, lobbying distorts carbon taxes downwards to reduce the tax burden and does not affect coalition sizes. This leads to higher emissions and lower welfare. By contrast, if tax revenues are given back to the firms, lobbies in the outsider countries favor carbon taxes, whereas lobbies in the coalition countries favor carbon subsidies to raise the international commodity price. This reduces the tax difference and the welfare difference between the countries, which reduces the free-rider incentives. Then, lobbying stabilizes the grand coalition and reduces global emissions compared to a “perfect” world without lobbying if the political influence is sufficiently strong.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
8.00
自引率
4.30%
发文量
91
期刊介绍: The Journal of Environmental Economics and Management publishes theoretical and empirical papers devoted to specific natural resources and environmental issues. For consideration, papers should (1) contain a substantial element embodying the linkage between economic systems and environmental and natural resources systems or (2) be of substantial importance in understanding the management and/or social control of the economy in its relations with the natural environment. Although the general orientation of the journal is toward economics, interdisciplinary papers by researchers in other fields of interest to resource and environmental economists will be welcomed.
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