共享乘车平台的效率

Terry A. Taylor
{"title":"共享乘车平台的效率","authors":"Terry A. Taylor","doi":"10.1287/msom.2021.0545","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Problem definition: Ride-hailing platforms offering shared rides devote effort to reducing the trip-lengthening detours that accommodate fellow customers’ divergent transportation needs. By reducing shared-ride delay, improving shared-ride efficiency has the twin benefits of making shared rides more attractive to customers and increasing the number of customers a driver can serve per unit time. Methodology/results: We analytically model a ride-hailing platform that can offer individual rides and shared rides. We establish results that are counter to naive intuition: greater customer sensitivity to shared-ride delay and greater labor cost can reduce the value of improving shared-ride efficiency, and an increase in shared-ride efficiency can prompt a platform to add individual-ride service. We show that when network effects are small, increasing shared-ride efficiency pushes wages to extremes: if the current wage is high (low), increasing shared-ride efficiency pushes the wage higher (lower). We provide a sharp characterization of whether shared-ride efficiency and labor supply are complements or substitutes. We provide simple conditions under which increasing shared-ride efficiency reduces (alternatively, increases) labor welfare. We provide evidence that increasing shared-ride efficiency increases consumer surplus. Managerial implications: Our results inform a platform’s decision of whether to invest in improving shared-ride efficiency, as well as how to change its service offering and wage, as shared-ride efficiency improves.Supplemental Material: The online supplement is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2021.0545 .","PeriodicalId":501267,"journal":{"name":"Manufacturing & Service Operations Management","volume":"112 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2024-04-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Shared-Ride Efficiency of Ride-Hailing Platforms\",\"authors\":\"Terry A. Taylor\",\"doi\":\"10.1287/msom.2021.0545\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Problem definition: Ride-hailing platforms offering shared rides devote effort to reducing the trip-lengthening detours that accommodate fellow customers’ divergent transportation needs. By reducing shared-ride delay, improving shared-ride efficiency has the twin benefits of making shared rides more attractive to customers and increasing the number of customers a driver can serve per unit time. Methodology/results: We analytically model a ride-hailing platform that can offer individual rides and shared rides. We establish results that are counter to naive intuition: greater customer sensitivity to shared-ride delay and greater labor cost can reduce the value of improving shared-ride efficiency, and an increase in shared-ride efficiency can prompt a platform to add individual-ride service. We show that when network effects are small, increasing shared-ride efficiency pushes wages to extremes: if the current wage is high (low), increasing shared-ride efficiency pushes the wage higher (lower). We provide a sharp characterization of whether shared-ride efficiency and labor supply are complements or substitutes. We provide simple conditions under which increasing shared-ride efficiency reduces (alternatively, increases) labor welfare. We provide evidence that increasing shared-ride efficiency increases consumer surplus. Managerial implications: Our results inform a platform’s decision of whether to invest in improving shared-ride efficiency, as well as how to change its service offering and wage, as shared-ride efficiency improves.Supplemental Material: The online supplement is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2021.0545 .\",\"PeriodicalId\":501267,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Manufacturing & Service Operations Management\",\"volume\":\"112 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-04-26\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Manufacturing & Service Operations Management\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2021.0545\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Manufacturing & Service Operations Management","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2021.0545","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

摘要

问题定义:提供共享乘车服务的打车平台致力于减少为满足乘客不同交通需求而延长行程的绕路现象。通过减少合乘延误,提高合乘效率可以带来双重好处:一是使合乘对顾客更具吸引力,二是增加司机在单位时间内可服务的顾客数量。方法/结果:我们对一个可提供个人乘车和共享乘车服务的打车平台进行了分析建模。我们得出了与天真直觉相反的结果:顾客对共享乘车延迟的敏感度越高,劳动力成本越高,共享乘车效率提高的价值就越低,而共享乘车效率的提高会促使平台增加个人乘车服务。我们的研究表明,当网络效应较小时,共享乘车效率的提高会将工资推向极端:如果当前工资较高(较低),共享乘车效率的提高会将工资推高(推低)。我们提供了共享乘车效率和劳动力供给是互补还是替代的清晰表征。我们提供了提高共乘效率会降低(或提高)劳动福利的简单条件。我们提供了提高共乘效率会增加消费者剩余的证据。对管理者的影响:我们的研究结果有助于平台决定是否投资提高共享乘车效率,以及在共享乘车效率提高时如何改变其提供的服务和工资:在线补充材料可在 https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2021.0545 上获取。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
Shared-Ride Efficiency of Ride-Hailing Platforms
Problem definition: Ride-hailing platforms offering shared rides devote effort to reducing the trip-lengthening detours that accommodate fellow customers’ divergent transportation needs. By reducing shared-ride delay, improving shared-ride efficiency has the twin benefits of making shared rides more attractive to customers and increasing the number of customers a driver can serve per unit time. Methodology/results: We analytically model a ride-hailing platform that can offer individual rides and shared rides. We establish results that are counter to naive intuition: greater customer sensitivity to shared-ride delay and greater labor cost can reduce the value of improving shared-ride efficiency, and an increase in shared-ride efficiency can prompt a platform to add individual-ride service. We show that when network effects are small, increasing shared-ride efficiency pushes wages to extremes: if the current wage is high (low), increasing shared-ride efficiency pushes the wage higher (lower). We provide a sharp characterization of whether shared-ride efficiency and labor supply are complements or substitutes. We provide simple conditions under which increasing shared-ride efficiency reduces (alternatively, increases) labor welfare. We provide evidence that increasing shared-ride efficiency increases consumer surplus. Managerial implications: Our results inform a platform’s decision of whether to invest in improving shared-ride efficiency, as well as how to change its service offering and wage, as shared-ride efficiency improves.Supplemental Material: The online supplement is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2021.0545 .
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
期刊最新文献
Competition in Optimal Stopping: Behavioral Insights Information Dependency in Mitigating Disruption Cascades Adaptive Two-Stage Stochastic Programming with an Analysis on Capacity Expansion Planning Problem Demand Equilibria in Spatial Service Systems Optimal Salesforce Compensation with General Demand and Operational Considerations
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1