{"title":"机构投资者和机会性收购的类型多样性","authors":"Juan Bu, Wei Shi, Cheng Yin","doi":"10.1177/01492063241244716","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Institutional investors of different types have been shown to exert differential influences on firm strategic decisions individually. Yet, research has largely overlooked how institutional investors of different types can collectively affect firm decision-making. This study investigates the legal type diversity of institutional ownership (hereafter “investor type diversity”) and its influence on corporate acquisitions. Because institutional investors with different legal types have distinct interests and objectives, investor type diversity can create principal–principal conflicts and prevent institutional investors from undertaking coordinated actions, weakening their collective power and ability to play a governance role. We posit that investor type diversity will be positively associated with CEOs’ opportunistic acquisitions because the dilution of shareholder governance, resulting from investor type diversity, grants CEOs the leeway to champion acquisitions aligned more with their personal gains. We also argue that the positive influence of investor type diversity on opportunistic acquisitions will be stronger when CEOs possess a higher level of general managerial ability. However, acquisitions pursued in the presence of higher investor type diversity will be associated with poorer performance. Findings from a sample of 2,106 U.S. firms lend support to our arguments. This study advances strategy research by highlighting the importance of investor type diversity in shaping shareholder governance effectiveness.","PeriodicalId":54212,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Management","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":9.3000,"publicationDate":"2024-04-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Type Diversity of Institutional Investors and Opportunistic Acquisitions\",\"authors\":\"Juan Bu, Wei Shi, Cheng Yin\",\"doi\":\"10.1177/01492063241244716\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Institutional investors of different types have been shown to exert differential influences on firm strategic decisions individually. Yet, research has largely overlooked how institutional investors of different types can collectively affect firm decision-making. This study investigates the legal type diversity of institutional ownership (hereafter “investor type diversity”) and its influence on corporate acquisitions. Because institutional investors with different legal types have distinct interests and objectives, investor type diversity can create principal–principal conflicts and prevent institutional investors from undertaking coordinated actions, weakening their collective power and ability to play a governance role. We posit that investor type diversity will be positively associated with CEOs’ opportunistic acquisitions because the dilution of shareholder governance, resulting from investor type diversity, grants CEOs the leeway to champion acquisitions aligned more with their personal gains. We also argue that the positive influence of investor type diversity on opportunistic acquisitions will be stronger when CEOs possess a higher level of general managerial ability. However, acquisitions pursued in the presence of higher investor type diversity will be associated with poorer performance. Findings from a sample of 2,106 U.S. firms lend support to our arguments. This study advances strategy research by highlighting the importance of investor type diversity in shaping shareholder governance effectiveness.\",\"PeriodicalId\":54212,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Management\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":9.3000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-04-28\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Management\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"91\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1177/01492063241244716\",\"RegionNum\":1,\"RegionCategory\":\"管理学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"BUSINESS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Management","FirstCategoryId":"91","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1177/01492063241244716","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"BUSINESS","Score":null,"Total":0}
Type Diversity of Institutional Investors and Opportunistic Acquisitions
Institutional investors of different types have been shown to exert differential influences on firm strategic decisions individually. Yet, research has largely overlooked how institutional investors of different types can collectively affect firm decision-making. This study investigates the legal type diversity of institutional ownership (hereafter “investor type diversity”) and its influence on corporate acquisitions. Because institutional investors with different legal types have distinct interests and objectives, investor type diversity can create principal–principal conflicts and prevent institutional investors from undertaking coordinated actions, weakening their collective power and ability to play a governance role. We posit that investor type diversity will be positively associated with CEOs’ opportunistic acquisitions because the dilution of shareholder governance, resulting from investor type diversity, grants CEOs the leeway to champion acquisitions aligned more with their personal gains. We also argue that the positive influence of investor type diversity on opportunistic acquisitions will be stronger when CEOs possess a higher level of general managerial ability. However, acquisitions pursued in the presence of higher investor type diversity will be associated with poorer performance. Findings from a sample of 2,106 U.S. firms lend support to our arguments. This study advances strategy research by highlighting the importance of investor type diversity in shaping shareholder governance effectiveness.
期刊介绍:
The Journal of Management (JOM) aims to publish rigorous empirical and theoretical research articles that significantly contribute to the field of management. It is particularly interested in papers that have a strong impact on the overall management discipline. JOM also encourages the submission of novel ideas and fresh perspectives on existing research.
The journal covers a wide range of areas, including business strategy and policy, organizational behavior, human resource management, organizational theory, entrepreneurship, and research methods. It provides a platform for scholars to present their work on these topics and fosters intellectual discussion and exchange in these areas.