机构投资者和机会性收购的类型多样性

IF 9.3 1区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS Journal of Management Pub Date : 2024-04-28 DOI:10.1177/01492063241244716
Juan Bu, Wei Shi, Cheng Yin
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引用次数: 0

摘要

研究表明,不同类型的机构投资者对企业战略决策的影响各不相同。然而,研究在很大程度上忽视了不同类型的机构投资者如何共同影响公司决策。本研究探讨了机构所有权的法律类型多样性(以下简称 "投资者类型多样性")及其对企业收购的影响。由于不同法律类型的机构投资者有着不同的利益和目标,投资者类型多样性会造成委托人与委托人之间的冲突,阻碍机构投资者采取协调行动,削弱其集体力量和发挥治理作用的能力。我们认为,投资者类型多样性与首席执行官的机会主义收购行为正相关,因为投资者类型多样性导致的股东治理稀释,为首席执行官提供了支持更符合其个人利益的收购行为的余地。我们还认为,当首席执行官拥有较高的综合管理能力时,投资者类型多样性对机会主义收购的积极影响会更大。然而,在投资者类型多元化程度较高的情况下进行的收购,其绩效也会较差。对 2,106 家美国公司的抽样调查结果支持了我们的论点。本研究通过强调投资者类型多样性在塑造股东治理有效性方面的重要性,推动了战略研究的发展。
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Type Diversity of Institutional Investors and Opportunistic Acquisitions
Institutional investors of different types have been shown to exert differential influences on firm strategic decisions individually. Yet, research has largely overlooked how institutional investors of different types can collectively affect firm decision-making. This study investigates the legal type diversity of institutional ownership (hereafter “investor type diversity”) and its influence on corporate acquisitions. Because institutional investors with different legal types have distinct interests and objectives, investor type diversity can create principal–principal conflicts and prevent institutional investors from undertaking coordinated actions, weakening their collective power and ability to play a governance role. We posit that investor type diversity will be positively associated with CEOs’ opportunistic acquisitions because the dilution of shareholder governance, resulting from investor type diversity, grants CEOs the leeway to champion acquisitions aligned more with their personal gains. We also argue that the positive influence of investor type diversity on opportunistic acquisitions will be stronger when CEOs possess a higher level of general managerial ability. However, acquisitions pursued in the presence of higher investor type diversity will be associated with poorer performance. Findings from a sample of 2,106 U.S. firms lend support to our arguments. This study advances strategy research by highlighting the importance of investor type diversity in shaping shareholder governance effectiveness.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
22.40
自引率
5.20%
发文量
0
期刊介绍: The Journal of Management (JOM) aims to publish rigorous empirical and theoretical research articles that significantly contribute to the field of management. It is particularly interested in papers that have a strong impact on the overall management discipline. JOM also encourages the submission of novel ideas and fresh perspectives on existing research. The journal covers a wide range of areas, including business strategy and policy, organizational behavior, human resource management, organizational theory, entrepreneurship, and research methods. It provides a platform for scholars to present their work on these topics and fosters intellectual discussion and exchange in these areas.
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