多战斗团队竞赛优胜者的努力

IF 1 3区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2024-05-01 DOI:10.1016/j.geb.2024.04.006
Stefano Barbieri , Marco Serena
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引用次数: 0

摘要

在多对战的团队竞赛中,如何组织战斗--按顺序或(部分)同时--可能会影响预期获胜者的总努力(WE),这是研发竞赛、选举和体育运动中的一个自然目标。我们将重点放在噪声(通过竞赛成功函数的判别能力建模)和跨队异质性上,而不考虑特定球员的异质性。在噪声足够大的情况下,我们证明(1) 如果参赛队是对称的,所有时间结构都会产生相同的 WE;(2) 如果参赛队是不对称的,完全同步的竞赛会使 WE 最大化,而完全顺序的竞赛会使 WE 最小化。在没有噪音的情况下,我们证明(3) 如果参赛队是对称的,则完全顺序竞赛可使 WE 最大化,而完全同步竞赛可使 WE 最小化;以及 (4) 如果参赛队是不对称的,则完全顺序和完全同步的时间结构都不能使 WE 最大化或最小化。我们的结果采用了一种简化时间结构比较的新技术:提取和合并。
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Winner's effort in multi-battle team contests

In multi-battle team contests with pairwise battles, how battles are organized—sequentially or (partially) simultaneously—may affect the expected winner's total effort (WE), a natural objective in R&D races, elections, and sports. We focus on noise (modeled via the contest success function's discriminatory power) and across-team heterogeneity, abstracting from player-specific heterogeneity. With sufficient noise, we show that: (1) If teams are symmetric, all temporal structures yield the same WE; and (2) If teams are asymmetric, WE is maximized by a fully simultaneous contest and minimized by a fully sequential one. With no noise, we show that: (3) If teams are symmetric, WE is maximized by a fully sequential contest and minimized by a fully simultaneous one; and (4) If teams are asymmetric, neither the fully sequential nor the fully simultaneous temporal structures maximize or minimize WE. Our results use a novel technique that simplifies temporal structure comparisons: extractions and mergers.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.90
自引率
9.10%
发文量
148
期刊介绍: Games and Economic Behavior facilitates cross-fertilization between theories and applications of game theoretic reasoning. It consistently attracts the best quality and most creative papers in interdisciplinary studies within the social, biological, and mathematical sciences. Most readers recognize it as the leading journal in game theory. Research Areas Include: • Game theory • Economics • Political science • Biology • Computer science • Mathematics • Psychology
期刊最新文献
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