Simulations, Skepticisms, and Transcendental Arguments

In a previous article, I developed transcendental arguments to refute several versions of Nick Bostrom’s simulation hypothesis. I called some of these arguments the sim-style argument. In this article, I have four main aims. First, I employ the sim-style argument to remedy a defect in Hilary Putnam’s brain-in-vat argument. Second, I show that the most radical skepticism, which Tim Button called the nightmarish Cartesian skepticism, can be refuted by the sim-style argument or by another transcendental argument I develop here. Third, I compare my approach to radical skepticisms with Donald Davidson’s, as it is often regarded as an exemplar of transcendental arguments. Fourth, I explain how the prominent objections, mainly developed by Barry Stroud, to transcendental arguments can incur two undesirable results: psychologism and Kantian skepticism.