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引用次数: 0
摘要
我们研究了通才型首席执行官（CEO），即获得跨公司和跨行业可转移技能的首席执行官，是否有较少的动机囤积坏消息。为了解决企业与首席执行官匹配所产生的内生性问题，我们采用了一种利用外生首席执行官更替的差分法、倾向得分匹配法和熵平衡匹配法以及奥斯特系数稳定性检验。我们发现，CEO 的综合能力指数（GAI）与未来股价暴跌风险之间存在负相关关系，这证明了我们的猜想。当劳动力需求较强和公司存在较多代理冲突时，CEO 的 GAI 对股价暴跌风险的影响更大。我们的分析进一步表明，通才型首席执行官通过增加条件会计保守主义和减少实际收益管理来降低股价暴跌风险。综上所述，我们的研究结果凸显了首席执行官的一般人力资本在提高其失败容忍度和缓解代理问题方面的作用。
We investigate whether generalist chief executive officers (CEOs), that is, CEOs who gain transferable skills across firms and industries, have less incentive to hoard bad news. To address endogeneity concerns stemming from firm–CEO matching, we deploy a difference‐in‐differences method utilizing exogenous CEO turnovers, propensity score matching and entropy balancing matching methods, and Oster's coefficient stability test. Supporting our conjecture, we find a negative relation between CEOs’ general ability index (GAI) and future stock price crash risk. The effect of CEOs’ GAI on crash risk is stronger when labor demand is stronger and when firms have more agency conflicts. Our analysis further suggests that generalist CEOs attenuate crash risk by increasing conditional accounting conservatism and reducing real earnings management. Taken together, our findings highlight the role of CEOs’ general human capital in increasing their tolerance for failure and mitigating the agency problem.
期刊介绍：
Journal of Business Finance and Accounting exists to publish high quality research papers in accounting, corporate finance, corporate governance and their interfaces. The interfaces are relevant in many areas such as financial reporting and communication, valuation, financial performance measurement and managerial reward and control structures. A feature of JBFA is that it recognises that informational problems are pervasive in financial markets and business organisations, and that accounting plays an important role in resolving such problems. JBFA welcomes both theoretical and empirical contributions. Nonetheless, theoretical papers should yield novel testable implications, and empirical papers should be theoretically well-motivated. The Editors view accounting and finance as being closely related to economics and, as a consequence, papers submitted will often have theoretical motivations that are grounded in economics. JBFA, however, also seeks papers that complement economics-based theorising with theoretical developments originating in other social science disciplines or traditions. While many papers in JBFA use econometric or related empirical methods, the Editors also welcome contributions that use other empirical research methods. Although the scope of JBFA is broad, it is not a suitable outlet for highly abstract mathematical papers, or empirical papers with inadequate theoretical motivation. Also, papers that study asset pricing, or the operations of financial markets, should have direct implications for one or more of preparers, regulators, users of financial statements, and corporate financial decision makers, or at least should have implications for the development of future research relevant to such users.
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