利润向外转移与跨国并购倾向

IF 4.5 2区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS British Journal of Management Pub Date : 2024-05-01 DOI:10.1111/1467-8551.12825
Janja A. Tardios, L. Jeremy Clegg
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引用次数: 0

摘要

规避责任的外国直接投资(FDI)是解释企业投资地点和投资方式的一类金融动机,但我们对这一现象的了解并不全面。与避税型外国直接投资(跨国企业在东道国投资以追求境内利润转移)相比,我们考虑了一种新的动机--东道国金融透明度低所吸引的外国直接投资,从而实现了境外利润转移(OPS)。跨境收购(CBA)是实现 OPS 和全球税收优化的一条收购途径。我们的实证背景是 1996-2015 年间 26 个国家 315 家收购方进行的 39951 次 CBA。我们假设并通过实证证明,OPS 与 CBA 之间存在正相关关系,且 CBA 的股权拥有概率较高。我们发现,东道国市场越有吸引力或收入越不平等,或者跨国公司所在行业是纵向或横向整合时,OPS 与 CBA 之间的关系就越强。我们的假设是,跨国企业需要内部能力来实施 OPS,但这一假设没有得到支持,我们将其归因于税务筹划咨询公司的服务。这些发现凸显了低财务透明度作为追求海外直接投资的新的地点决定因素的作用,并强调了作为规避问责的海外直接投资的表现形式的境内和境外利润转移之间的区别。
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Outbound Profit Shifting and the Propensity to Engage in Cross‐Border Acquisitions
Accountability‐avoiding foreign direct investment (FDI) is a category of financial motives explaining where firms invest and how, yet our grasp of this phenomenon is incomplete. In contrast with tax‐haven FDI, where multinational enterprises (MNEs) invest in a host country to pursue inbound profit shifting, we consider a novel motive – FDI attracted by low host country financial transparency that enables outbound profit shifting (OPS). Cross‐border acquisitions (CBAs) are a takeover route to achieving OPS and global tax optimization. Our empirical context is 39,951 CBAs by 315 acquirers from 26 countries in the 1996–2015 period. We hypothesize and empirically show a positive relationship between OPS and CBAs and the probability that equity ownership of CBAs will be high. We find that the relationship between OPS and CBAs is stronger the more attractive or income unequal the host market, or when the multinational's industry is vertically or horizontally integrated. We attribute the lack of support for our hypothesis that MNEs require in‐house capability to conduct OPS to tax planning consultancies’ services. These findings highlight the role of low financial transparency as a novel locational determinant of OPS‐pursuing FDI and emphasize the distinction between inbound and outbound profit shifting as manifestations of accountability‐avoiding FDI.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
10.00
自引率
12.50%
发文量
87
期刊介绍: The British Journal of Management provides a valuable outlet for research and scholarship on management-orientated themes and topics. It publishes articles of a multi-disciplinary and interdisciplinary nature as well as empirical research from within traditional disciplines and managerial functions. With contributions from around the globe, the journal includes articles across the full range of business and management disciplines. A subscription to British Journal of Management includes International Journal of Management Reviews, also published on behalf of the British Academy of Management.
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