多部门经济中的碳定价与社会折扣

IF 5.5 3区 经济学 Q1 BUSINESS Journal of Environmental Economics and Management Pub Date : 2024-05-01 DOI:10.1016/j.jeem.2024.102991
Oliver Kalsbach , Sebastian Rausch
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引用次数: 0

摘要

经济学家倾向于将统一排放价格视为减少温室气体排放最具成本效益的方法。本文仔细研究了一般均衡中的假设,这些假设是统一排放定价最优这一既定观点的基础,重点关注社会比私人行为者更重视后代福祉的经济体。当社会贴现率和私人贴现率不同时,我们表明,只有在技术同质性和跨期决策的限制性假设下,统一碳价格才是最优的。非统一定价会刺激资本积累,使后代受益。根据资本和能源投入之间可替代性的部门异质性,我们发现不同部门的最优碳价格差异很大,相对于统一定价,最优碳价格能带来巨大的福利收益。然而,要实现这些福利收益,需要监管机构掌握各部门技术异质性的信息。根据对技术异质性的不完全估计进行差别碳定价,可能会产生巨大的福利损失。
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Pricing carbon in a multi-sector economy with social discounting

Economists tend to view a uniform emissions price as the most cost-effective approach to reducing greenhouse gas emissions. This paper scrutinizes the assumptions in general equilibrium which underlie the established view that uniform emissions pricing is optimal, focusing on economies where society values the well-being of future generations more than private actors. When social and private discount rates differ, we show that a uniform carbon price is optimal only under restrictive assumptions about technology homogeneity and intertemporal decision-making. Non-uniform pricing spurs capital accumulation and benefits future generations. Depending on sectoral heterogeneity in the substitutability between capital and energy inputs, we find that optimal carbon prices differ widely across sectors and yield substantial welfare gains relative to uniform pricing. Realizing these welfare gains, however, requires that the regulator has information on the technology heterogeneity across sectors. Differentiated carbon pricing based on imperfect estimates of technology heterogeneity can yield significant welfare losses.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
8.00
自引率
4.30%
发文量
91
期刊介绍: The Journal of Environmental Economics and Management publishes theoretical and empirical papers devoted to specific natural resources and environmental issues. For consideration, papers should (1) contain a substantial element embodying the linkage between economic systems and environmental and natural resources systems or (2) be of substantial importance in understanding the management and/or social control of the economy in its relations with the natural environment. Although the general orientation of the journal is toward economics, interdisciplinary papers by researchers in other fields of interest to resource and environmental economists will be welcomed.
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