{"title":"作为财产的实践:柏拉图《共和国》中的正义概念","authors":"L.J.A. Klein","doi":"10.1163/20512996-12340435","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>Scholarship on the Republic has tended to stress the centrality of the tripartite soul to the Republic’s conception of justice. Yet since Socrates’s task in the dialogue is to show the desirability of justice in the ordinary Athenian sense, any emphasis on idiosyncratic psychology would render his account of justice fundamentally beside the point. This paper suggests a way out of this dilemma. It argues that Platonic justice in the Republic represents a shrewd twist on the entirely conventional, distributive Athenian notion of justice as refraining from seizing for oneself what belongs to another. Plato’s twist is to substitute the performance of one’s own activity (<styled-content lang=\"el-Grek\" xmlns:dc=\"http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/\" xmlns:ifp=\"http://www.ifactory.com/press\">πρᾶξις τα ἑαυτοῦ</styled-content>) for the possession of one’s household goods (<styled-content lang=\"el-Grek\" xmlns:dc=\"http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/\" xmlns:ifp=\"http://www.ifactory.com/press\">ἕξις τα ἑαυτοῦ</styled-content>) as the proper object of justice. The paper then shows how this account of Platonic justice makes sense both textually and contextually, before concluding.</p>","PeriodicalId":43237,"journal":{"name":"POLIS","volume":"61 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3000,"publicationDate":"2024-05-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Praxis as Property: the Concept of Justice in Plato’s Republic\",\"authors\":\"L.J.A. Klein\",\"doi\":\"10.1163/20512996-12340435\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p>Scholarship on the Republic has tended to stress the centrality of the tripartite soul to the Republic’s conception of justice. Yet since Socrates’s task in the dialogue is to show the desirability of justice in the ordinary Athenian sense, any emphasis on idiosyncratic psychology would render his account of justice fundamentally beside the point. This paper suggests a way out of this dilemma. It argues that Platonic justice in the Republic represents a shrewd twist on the entirely conventional, distributive Athenian notion of justice as refraining from seizing for oneself what belongs to another. Plato’s twist is to substitute the performance of one’s own activity (<styled-content lang=\\\"el-Grek\\\" xmlns:dc=\\\"http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/\\\" xmlns:ifp=\\\"http://www.ifactory.com/press\\\">πρᾶξις τα ἑαυτοῦ</styled-content>) for the possession of one’s household goods (<styled-content lang=\\\"el-Grek\\\" xmlns:dc=\\\"http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/\\\" xmlns:ifp=\\\"http://www.ifactory.com/press\\\">ἕξις τα ἑαυτοῦ</styled-content>) as the proper object of justice. The paper then shows how this account of Platonic justice makes sense both textually and contextually, before concluding.</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":43237,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"POLIS\",\"volume\":\"61 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.3000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-05-02\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"POLIS\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1163/20512996-12340435\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"历史学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"0\",\"JCRName\":\"CLASSICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"POLIS","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1163/20512996-12340435","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"历史学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"CLASSICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
摘要
研究《共和国》的学者倾向于强调三方灵魂在《共和国》正义观中的核心地位。然而,由于苏格拉底在对话中的任务是展示普通雅典人意义上的正义的可取性,任何对特异心理学的强调都会使他对正义的论述从根本上失去意义。本文提出了摆脱这一困境的方法。本文认为,《共和国》中柏拉图式的正义是对雅典人完全传统的、分配式的正义概念的精明转折,即不把属于他人的东西据为己有。柏拉图的曲解是以一个人从事自己的活动(πρᾶξις τα ἑαυτοῦ)来取代对一个人的家庭财产(ἕξις τα ἑαυτοῦ)的占有,以此作为正义的适当对象。然后,本文从文本和上下文两方面说明了柏拉图正义论的合理性,最后得出结论。
Praxis as Property: the Concept of Justice in Plato’s Republic
Scholarship on the Republic has tended to stress the centrality of the tripartite soul to the Republic’s conception of justice. Yet since Socrates’s task in the dialogue is to show the desirability of justice in the ordinary Athenian sense, any emphasis on idiosyncratic psychology would render his account of justice fundamentally beside the point. This paper suggests a way out of this dilemma. It argues that Platonic justice in the Republic represents a shrewd twist on the entirely conventional, distributive Athenian notion of justice as refraining from seizing for oneself what belongs to another. Plato’s twist is to substitute the performance of one’s own activity (πρᾶξις τα ἑαυτοῦ) for the possession of one’s household goods (ἕξις τα ἑαυτοῦ) as the proper object of justice. The paper then shows how this account of Platonic justice makes sense both textually and contextually, before concluding.