Zigang Chen, Chaochao Fan, Tao Leng, Long Chen, Yuhong Liu, Xiaoyong Li, Dongfeng Yuan
{"title":"网络攻防过程中的三方演化博弈","authors":"Zigang Chen, Chaochao Fan, Tao Leng, Long Chen, Yuhong Liu, Xiaoyong Li, Dongfeng Yuan","doi":"10.1007/s11235-024-01130-9","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>At present, confrontations in cyberspace are becoming increasingly fierce, and network attacks and defenses have become the main form of confrontation between parties in cyberspace. The maximum benefit can be obtained by using scientific decision-making. Traditional network attack and defense research mainly focuses on the relationship between network attackers and network defenders, but more is need to explain the benefits of the evolution of network attacks and defenses. Given this, this paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model among network attackers, network defenders, and government regulators, analyzes the evolutionary stability of each participant’s strategy choice, discusses the influence of each element on the tripartite strategic choices, and further analyzes the stability of the equilibrium point of the tripartite evolutionary system. The research results show that (1) the timely supervision of the network by the government supervision department is conducive to enhancing the construction of network security and has strategic significance for the security of cyberspace; (2) the network defense department can obtain more effective defense measures when being attacked by the network; (3) the network defense party can analyze the strategic defense requirements that are more in line with its own benefits. Finally, we use Matlab2021a to conduct simulation analysis, verify the effectiveness of the evolutionary game model under different initial conditions, and put forward reasonable suggestions for network defenders and government regulators according to the conclusions of the analysis.</p>","PeriodicalId":51194,"journal":{"name":"Telecommunication Systems","volume":"108 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7000,"publicationDate":"2024-05-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Tripartite evolutionary game in the process of network attack and defense\",\"authors\":\"Zigang Chen, Chaochao Fan, Tao Leng, Long Chen, Yuhong Liu, Xiaoyong Li, Dongfeng Yuan\",\"doi\":\"10.1007/s11235-024-01130-9\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p>At present, confrontations in cyberspace are becoming increasingly fierce, and network attacks and defenses have become the main form of confrontation between parties in cyberspace. The maximum benefit can be obtained by using scientific decision-making. Traditional network attack and defense research mainly focuses on the relationship between network attackers and network defenders, but more is need to explain the benefits of the evolution of network attacks and defenses. Given this, this paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model among network attackers, network defenders, and government regulators, analyzes the evolutionary stability of each participant’s strategy choice, discusses the influence of each element on the tripartite strategic choices, and further analyzes the stability of the equilibrium point of the tripartite evolutionary system. The research results show that (1) the timely supervision of the network by the government supervision department is conducive to enhancing the construction of network security and has strategic significance for the security of cyberspace; (2) the network defense department can obtain more effective defense measures when being attacked by the network; (3) the network defense party can analyze the strategic defense requirements that are more in line with its own benefits. Finally, we use Matlab2021a to conduct simulation analysis, verify the effectiveness of the evolutionary game model under different initial conditions, and put forward reasonable suggestions for network defenders and government regulators according to the conclusions of the analysis.</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":51194,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Telecommunication Systems\",\"volume\":\"108 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.7000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-05-06\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Telecommunication Systems\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"94\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11235-024-01130-9\",\"RegionNum\":4,\"RegionCategory\":\"计算机科学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q3\",\"JCRName\":\"TELECOMMUNICATIONS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Telecommunication Systems","FirstCategoryId":"94","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11235-024-01130-9","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"TELECOMMUNICATIONS","Score":null,"Total":0}
Tripartite evolutionary game in the process of network attack and defense
At present, confrontations in cyberspace are becoming increasingly fierce, and network attacks and defenses have become the main form of confrontation between parties in cyberspace. The maximum benefit can be obtained by using scientific decision-making. Traditional network attack and defense research mainly focuses on the relationship between network attackers and network defenders, but more is need to explain the benefits of the evolution of network attacks and defenses. Given this, this paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model among network attackers, network defenders, and government regulators, analyzes the evolutionary stability of each participant’s strategy choice, discusses the influence of each element on the tripartite strategic choices, and further analyzes the stability of the equilibrium point of the tripartite evolutionary system. The research results show that (1) the timely supervision of the network by the government supervision department is conducive to enhancing the construction of network security and has strategic significance for the security of cyberspace; (2) the network defense department can obtain more effective defense measures when being attacked by the network; (3) the network defense party can analyze the strategic defense requirements that are more in line with its own benefits. Finally, we use Matlab2021a to conduct simulation analysis, verify the effectiveness of the evolutionary game model under different initial conditions, and put forward reasonable suggestions for network defenders and government regulators according to the conclusions of the analysis.
期刊介绍:
Telecommunication Systems is a journal covering all aspects of modeling, analysis, design and management of telecommunication systems. The journal publishes high quality articles dealing with the use of analytic and quantitative tools for the modeling, analysis, design and management of telecommunication systems covering:
Performance Evaluation of Wide Area and Local Networks;
Network Interconnection;
Wire, wireless, Adhoc, mobile networks;
Impact of New Services (economic and organizational impact);
Fiberoptics and photonic switching;
DSL, ADSL, cable TV and their impact;
Design and Analysis Issues in Metropolitan Area Networks;
Networking Protocols;
Dynamics and Capacity Expansion of Telecommunication Systems;
Multimedia Based Systems, Their Design Configuration and Impact;
Configuration of Distributed Systems;
Pricing for Networking and Telecommunication Services;
Performance Analysis of Local Area Networks;
Distributed Group Decision Support Systems;
Configuring Telecommunication Systems with Reliability and Availability;
Cost Benefit Analysis and Economic Impact of Telecommunication Systems;
Standardization and Regulatory Issues;
Security, Privacy and Encryption in Telecommunication Systems;
Cellular, Mobile and Satellite Based Systems.