{"title":"当自杀不是自尽时:预先决定和心理中断--第二部分。","authors":"Suzanne E Dowie","doi":"10.1017/S0963180124000239","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Derek Parfit's view of personal identity raises questions about whether advance decisions refusing life-saving treatment should be honored in cases where a patient loses psychological continuity; it implies that these advance decisions would not be <i>self</i>-determining at all. However, rather than accepting that an unknown metaphysical 'further fact' underpins agential unity, one can accept Parfit's view but offer a different account of what it implies morally. Part II of this article argues that contractual obligations provide a moral basis for honoring advance decisions refusing life-saving and/or life-sustaining medical treatment; advance decisions have similarities to contracts, such as life insurance policies and will-contracts, that come into effect when the psychological discontinuity is through death.</p>","PeriodicalId":55300,"journal":{"name":"Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics","volume":" ","pages":"1-12"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5000,"publicationDate":"2024-05-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"When Suicide is not a <i>Self</i>-Killing: Advance Decisions and Psychological Discontinuity-Part II.\",\"authors\":\"Suzanne E Dowie\",\"doi\":\"10.1017/S0963180124000239\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p><p>Derek Parfit's view of personal identity raises questions about whether advance decisions refusing life-saving treatment should be honored in cases where a patient loses psychological continuity; it implies that these advance decisions would not be <i>self</i>-determining at all. However, rather than accepting that an unknown metaphysical 'further fact' underpins agential unity, one can accept Parfit's view but offer a different account of what it implies morally. Part II of this article argues that contractual obligations provide a moral basis for honoring advance decisions refusing life-saving and/or life-sustaining medical treatment; advance decisions have similarities to contracts, such as life insurance policies and will-contracts, that come into effect when the psychological discontinuity is through death.</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":55300,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics\",\"volume\":\" \",\"pages\":\"1-12\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.5000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-05-09\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"3\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0963180124000239\",\"RegionNum\":4,\"RegionCategory\":\"医学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q3\",\"JCRName\":\"HEALTH CARE SCIENCES & SERVICES\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics","FirstCategoryId":"3","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0963180124000239","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"医学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"HEALTH CARE SCIENCES & SERVICES","Score":null,"Total":0}
When Suicide is not a Self-Killing: Advance Decisions and Psychological Discontinuity-Part II.
Derek Parfit's view of personal identity raises questions about whether advance decisions refusing life-saving treatment should be honored in cases where a patient loses psychological continuity; it implies that these advance decisions would not be self-determining at all. However, rather than accepting that an unknown metaphysical 'further fact' underpins agential unity, one can accept Parfit's view but offer a different account of what it implies morally. Part II of this article argues that contractual obligations provide a moral basis for honoring advance decisions refusing life-saving and/or life-sustaining medical treatment; advance decisions have similarities to contracts, such as life insurance policies and will-contracts, that come into effect when the psychological discontinuity is through death.
期刊介绍:
The Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics is designed to address the challenges of biology, medicine and healthcare and to meet the needs of professionals serving on healthcare ethics committees in hospitals, nursing homes, hospices and rehabilitation centres. The aim of the journal is to serve as the international forum for the wide range of serious and urgent issues faced by members of healthcare ethics committees, physicians, nurses, social workers, clergy, lawyers and community representatives.