有代表性的赔偿和伤残索赔结果

IF 4.8 1区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS Journal of Public Economics Pub Date : 2024-05-16 DOI:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2024.105132
Cody Tuttle , Riley Wilson
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引用次数: 0

摘要

许多社会保障伤残保险(SSDI)的申请人都会聘请法律代表来帮助他们完成审批程序。社会保障局对代理人的报酬有严格的规定。只有当申请人获得伤残赔偿时,才会向代理人支付报酬,而且代理人的报酬为申请人过去应付福利金的 25% 或预先规定的最高费用(自 2022 年起为 7,200 美元),以较低者为准。由于逾期福利金是申请人等待获得赔偿的月数的函数,因此代理人有动力推迟案件的解决,直到逾期福利金使代理人费用超过费用上限。我们使用差分法来评估这些激励因素如何影响 SSDI 申请人的等待时间。2002 年酬金上限提高后,酬金门槛对其有更大约束力的申请人的平均等待时间增加了 0.85 个月,这意味着有代表的申请人的等待时间增加了 2.6-5.6 个月。这表明代理人的报酬结构对案件结果确实有影响,并突出了与辅助代理人的互动的重要性,这种互动在现代社会计划中非常普遍。
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Representative compensation and disability claimant outcomes

Many claimants of Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) retain legal representation to help with the approval process. The Social Security Administration imposes strict rules on representative compensation. Representatives are only paid if claimants are awarded disability, and they are paid the lesser of 25 percent of the claimant’s past due benefits or a pre-specified maximum fee ($7,200 since 2022). Because past due benefits are a function of the number of months claimants wait to be awarded, representatives face incentives to delay case resolution until past due benefits push the representative fees past the fee ceiling. We use difference-in-differences to evaluate how these incentives impact SSDI claimant wait times. After the fee ceiling increased in 2002, average wait times increased by 0.85 months among claimants for whom the fee threshold is more binding, implying a 2.6–5.6 month increase for claimants with representatives. This indicates that the structure of representative compensation does matter for case outcomes, and highlights the importance of interactions with auxiliary agents so common in modern social programs.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
14.10
自引率
2.00%
发文量
139
审稿时长
70 days
期刊介绍: The Journal of Public Economics aims to promote original scientific research in the field of public economics, focusing on the utilization of contemporary economic theory and quantitative analysis methodologies. It serves as a platform for the international scholarly community to engage in discussions on public policy matters.
期刊最新文献
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