{"title":"衰退行业的兼并","authors":"Tirza Angerhofer","doi":"10.1007/s11151-024-09966-w","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>Declining industries are characterized by prolonged declines in demand and excess capacity. Mergers of firms in declining industries often lead to rationalization of capacity, which makes production more efficient and makes firms better off. This benefit, however, may not be merger-specific, since capacity could be rationalized via firm exit. But the exit process itself may lead to inefficiencies, such as delays and inefficient ordering of exit (i.e., low-cost capital exits before high cost capital), which could warrant a merger. Increased market power of the combined firm, however, may lead to higher prices for consumers, which would be anticompetitive. This article considers the procompetitive efficiencies and anticompetitive consequences of mergers in declining industries and will discuss how the Agencies may evaluate these mergers.</p>","PeriodicalId":47454,"journal":{"name":"Review of Industrial Organization","volume":"22 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8000,"publicationDate":"2024-05-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Mergers in Declining Industry\",\"authors\":\"Tirza Angerhofer\",\"doi\":\"10.1007/s11151-024-09966-w\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p>Declining industries are characterized by prolonged declines in demand and excess capacity. Mergers of firms in declining industries often lead to rationalization of capacity, which makes production more efficient and makes firms better off. This benefit, however, may not be merger-specific, since capacity could be rationalized via firm exit. But the exit process itself may lead to inefficiencies, such as delays and inefficient ordering of exit (i.e., low-cost capital exits before high cost capital), which could warrant a merger. Increased market power of the combined firm, however, may lead to higher prices for consumers, which would be anticompetitive. This article considers the procompetitive efficiencies and anticompetitive consequences of mergers in declining industries and will discuss how the Agencies may evaluate these mergers.</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":47454,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Review of Industrial Organization\",\"volume\":\"22 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.8000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-05-18\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Review of Industrial Organization\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-024-09966-w\",\"RegionNum\":4,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q3\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Review of Industrial Organization","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-024-09966-w","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
Declining industries are characterized by prolonged declines in demand and excess capacity. Mergers of firms in declining industries often lead to rationalization of capacity, which makes production more efficient and makes firms better off. This benefit, however, may not be merger-specific, since capacity could be rationalized via firm exit. But the exit process itself may lead to inefficiencies, such as delays and inefficient ordering of exit (i.e., low-cost capital exits before high cost capital), which could warrant a merger. Increased market power of the combined firm, however, may lead to higher prices for consumers, which would be anticompetitive. This article considers the procompetitive efficiencies and anticompetitive consequences of mergers in declining industries and will discuss how the Agencies may evaluate these mergers.
期刊介绍:
New Online Manuscript Submission System The Review of Industrial Organization publishes research papers on all aspects of industrial organization, broadly defined. A main focus is on competition and monopoly, in their many forms and processes and their effects on efficiency, innovation, and social conditions. Topics may range from the internal organization of enterprises to wide international comparisons.
The Review is also increasing its interest in papers on public policies such as antitrust, regulation, deregulation, public enterprise, and privatization. Papers may deal with any economic sectors and any developed economies.
The Review continues its primary interest in ideas that can be verified by econometric evidence, case studies, or other real conditions. But the Review also seeks papers that advance significant theories of industrial organization and policy. Papers using abstract techniques and econometric tests should present the methods and analysis in plain enough English so that non-specialist readers can evaluate the content.
The Review welcomes submissions from any source, and the Editors will make every effort to have papers reviewed quickly and to give prompt decisions. The Editors will also seek to arrange symposia on specific topics, and they are open to proposals for grouped papers. They also welcome shorter notes and commentaries on topics of interest to the profession.
Officially cited as: Rev Ind Organ