网络结构经济博弈中直接和间接互惠的证据

Daniel Redhead, Matthew Gervais, Kotrina Kajokaite, Jeremy Koster, Arlenys Hurtado Manyoma, Danier Hurtado Manyoma, Richard McElreath, Cody T. Ross
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摘要

正式的理论模型认为,当个体的行为以社会地位为条件时,合作网络就能得以维持。在这里,我们通过在哥伦比亚四个农村社区(Nind = 496 人,Nobs = 53,876 次评分/转让)中进行的一套网络结构经济博弈,对这种积极和消极间接互惠模型的预测进行了实证检验。我们观察到,在二元对立层面上,个体强烈倾向于剥削和惩罚信誉差的人(如被认为自私的人),并将资源分配给信誉好的人(如被认为慷慨的人)。在社区层面,慷慨的名声与接受资源分配有关,而自私的名声与接受惩罚有关。这些实证结果说明了积极互惠、消极互惠和代价高昂的惩罚在维持整个社区的合作网络方面所起的作用。积极和消极互惠以及代价高昂的惩罚在合作网络中发挥着作用。哥伦比亚农村社区的成员表现出一种强烈的倾向,即惩罚被认为自私的人,并将资源分配给被认为慷慨的人。
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Evidence of direct and indirect reciprocity in network-structured economic games
Formal theoretical models propose that cooperative networks can be maintained when individuals condition behavior on social standing. Here, we empirically examine the predictions of such models of positive and negative indirect reciprocity using a suite of network-structured economic games in four rural Colombian communities (Nind = 496 individuals, Nobs = 53,876 ratings/transfers). We observe that, at a dyadic-level, individuals have a strong tendency to exploit and punish others in bad standing (e.g., those perceived as selfish), and allocate resources to those in good standing (e.g., those perceived as generous). These dyadic findings scale to a more generalized, community level, where reputations for being generous are associated with receipt of allocations, and reputations for being selfish are associated with receipt of punishment. These empirical results illustrate the roles that both positive and negative reciprocity, and costly punishment, play in sustaining community-wide cooperation networks. Positive and negative reciprocity, and costly punishment play, a role in cooperation networks. Members of rural Colombian communities show a strong tendency to punish others perceived as selfish and allocate resources to those perceived as generous.
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