真实运动中的伯克利

IF 1.4 2区 哲学 Q1 HISTORY & PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2024-05-24 DOI:10.1016/j.shpsa.2024.05.015
Scott Harkema
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引用次数: 0

摘要

对近代早期关于绝对空间和相对空间以及运动的争论进行研究时,往往忽略了真正运动的概念在这场争论中的重要性。即使是否认绝对空间存在的哲学家也坚持认为,真正的运动可以与仅仅是表象的运动区分开来。在本文中,我将研究伯克利对这种区分的认可及其引发的问题。首先,伯克利的认可引发了与他的其他哲学承诺(即他的唯心主义)的一致性问题。其次,伯克利的认可引发了一个充分性问题,即伯克利能否充分说明真实运动与表象运动之间的区别。在本文中,我认为对柏克莱区分形而上学、科学和庸俗领域中的真谛的敏感性可以解决一致性和充分性问题。我认为,柏克莱只接受科学和庸俗领域中的真实运动,而不接受形而上学领域中的真实运动。因此,他对科学和普通语言中真实运动的认可与其形而上学唯心主义之间并不存在矛盾。此外,我认为,对这三个领域的敏感性表明,柏克莱拥有足够的资源来充分说明在自然科学中如何发现真正的运动。
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Berkeley on true motion

Studies of the Early Modern debate concerning absolute and relative space and motion often ignore the significance of the concept of true motion in this debate. Even philosophers who denied the existence of absolute space maintained that true motions could be distinguished from merely apparent ones. In this paper, I examine Berkeley's endorsement of this distinction and the problems it raises. First, Berkeley's endorsement raises a problem of consistency with his other philosophical commitments, namely his idealism. Second, Berkeley's endorsement raises a problem of adequacy, namely whether Berkeley can provide an adequate account of what grounds the distinction between true and merely apparent motion. In this paper, I argue that sensitivity to Berkeley's distinction between what is true in the metaphysical, scientific, and vulgar domains can address both the consistency and the adequacy problems. I argue that Berkeley only accepts true motion in the scientific and vulgar domains, and not the metaphysical. There is thus no inconsistency between his endorsement of true motion in science and ordinary language, and his metaphysical idealism. Further, I suggest that sensitivity to these three domains shows that Berkeley possesses resources to give an adequate account of how true motions are discovered in natural science.

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来源期刊
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 管理科学-科学史与科学哲学
CiteScore
2.50
自引率
10.00%
发文量
166
审稿时长
6.6 weeks
期刊介绍: Studies in History and Philosophy of Science is devoted to the integrated study of the history, philosophy and sociology of the sciences. The editors encourage contributions both in the long-established areas of the history of the sciences and the philosophy of the sciences and in the topical areas of historiography of the sciences, the sciences in relation to gender, culture and society and the sciences in relation to arts. The Journal is international in scope and content and publishes papers from a wide range of countries and cultural traditions.
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