双重幻灭:1974 年双重解体的法律和政治方面

IF 0.6 4区 社会学 Q1 HISTORY Australian Journal of Politics and History Pub Date : 2024-05-19 DOI:10.1111/ajph.12991
Matt Harvey
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引用次数: 0

摘要

联邦宪法的一大未解之谜是,众议院和参议院是否平等,还是最终一方的权力大于另一方。1972 年当选的惠特拉姆工党政府面对的是 1967 年和 1970 年选出的参议院。尽管受到参议院的阻挠,惠特拉姆还是在 1973 年至 1974 年期间推行了一项雄心勃勃的立法计划。到 1974 年 4 月,有六项法案似乎 "触发 "了《宪法》第 57 节中的僵局解决程序。第 57 条规定,如果一项法案两次被众议院通过,两次被参议院否决,总督可以解散参众两院并举行选举。如果政府当选并希望继续执行触发法案,它可以再次在众议院通过法案,如果法案再次被参议院否决,总督可以召集两院联席会议,如果法案在联席会议上以绝对多数获得批准,则视为通过。参议院的重大阻挠,包括反对党威胁阻止供应,导致惠特拉姆寻求二次解散,希望获得参众两院的多数票,或者在参众两院联席会议上通过触发法案。在随后的选举中,惠特拉姆政府在众议院重新执政,但在参议院仍未获得多数席位。这导致了联邦历史上唯一一次联席会议,六项触发法案全部获得通过。但是,《石油和矿产管理局法案》随后被高等法院认定未获有效通过,这在宪法上留下了隐患。这一案件被认为使第 57 条可能无法实施。1974 年的双重解散与 1975 年的双重解散形成了鲜明对比,后者被认为是其 "邪恶的孪生兄弟"。自 1975 年以来,又进行了三次双重解散:1983 年、1987 年和 2016 年,但没有再举行联合庭审。1987 年,原本计划就身份证提案举行联席会议,但因技术问题而未能如愿。因此,1974 年的双重解散达到了打破僵局的目的,但代价是为下定决心的参议院提供了一个使第 57 条无法实施的途径。
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Double Disillusion: Legal and Political Aspects of the 1974 Double Dissolution

One of the great unanswered questions of the Commonwealth Constitution is whether the House of Representatives and Senate are equal or whether one ultimately has more power than the other. The Whitlam Labor government elected in 1972 faced a Senate elected in 1967 and 1970. Despite Senate obstruction, Whitlam proceeded with an ambitious legislative programme through 1973 and into 1974. By April 1974, six bills appeared to provide a “trigger” for the use of the Section 57 deadlock resolution procedure in the Constitution. Section 57 provides that if a bill has been twice passed by the House of Representatives and twice rejected by the Senate, the Governor-General can dissolve both houses and an election is held. If the government is returned and wishes to proceed with the trigger bills, it can again pass them through the House and if they are again rejected by the Senate, the Governor-General can convene a joint sitting of the two houses at which, if the bill is approved by an absolute majority, it is deemed to be passed. Major obstruction in the Senate, including a threat by the Opposition to block supply, led Whitlam to seek a double dissolution, hoping to gain a majority in both houses or, failing that, the opportunity to pass the trigger bills at a joint sitting. The ensuing election saw the return of the Whitlam government in the House but continuing to lack a majority in the Senate. This led to the only joint sitting in federal history, in which all six trigger bills were passed. But there was a constitutional sting in the tail when the Petroleum and Minerals Authority Act was subsequently found by the High Court not to have been validly passed. This case is argued to have made s57 potentially unworkable. The 1974 double dissolution stands in stark contrast to the 1975 double dissolution, which is argued here to be its “Evil Twin.” There have been three further double dissolutions since 1975: 1983, 1987, and 2016, but no more joint sittings. In 1987, there was set to be a joint sitting on the proposal for an identity card, but this was thwarted on a technicality. So the 1974 double dissolution achieved the objective of breaking a deadlock but at the cost of revealing a way for a determined Senate to make s57 unworkable.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
0.60
自引率
12.50%
发文量
59
期刊介绍: The Australian Journal of Politics and History presents papers addressing significant problems of general interest to those working in the fields of history, political studies and international affairs. Articles explore the politics and history of Australia and modern Europe, intellectual history, political history, and the history of political thought. The journal also publishes articles in the fields of international politics, Australian foreign policy, and Australia relations with the countries of the Asia-Pacific region.
期刊最新文献
Issue Information Issue Information Western Australia July to December 2023 Commonwealth of Australia July to December 2023 Issues in Australian Foreign Policy July to December 2023
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