意向性身份的关系理论

IF 1.8 1区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY MIND Pub Date : 2024-05-31 DOI:10.1093/mind/fzae021
Dilip Ninan
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引用次数: 0

摘要

这篇文章主张用关系论的方法来处理像(1)这样的意向性身份句:(1) Hob 认为女巫玷污了 Bob 的母马,Nob 认为女巫杀死了 Cob 的母猪。根据关系论,a 认为 ϕ 和 b 认为 ψ 这两种形式的事实一般不能还原为 c 认为 χ 这种形式的事实。我首先论证了现有的、非关系主义的意向同一性处理方法是不能令人满意的,然后详细地提出并探讨了关系主义的替代方法。我表明,关系论的一般论点可以直接通过文献中已经讨论过的案例来激发,然后在可能世界框架中发展出关系论的一个特殊版本。由此产生的理论避免了非关系论对手所面临的问题,并对(1)的真值条件做出了自然的解释,真值条件可以通过动态语义学的一个版本以组合的方式生成。该理论还帮助我们将意向同一性的语义问题与元语义问题干净利落地分开。
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A Relationist Theory of Intentional Identity
This essay argues for a relationist treatment of intentional identity sentences like (1): (1) Hob believes that a witch blighted Bob’s mare and Nob believes that she killed Cob’s sow. According to relationism, facts of the form a believes that ϕ and b believes that ψ are not in general reducible to facts of the form c believes that χ. I first argue that extant, non-relationist treatments of intentional identity are unsatisfactory, and then go on to motivate and explore a relationist alternative in some detail. I show that the general thesis of relationism can be directly motivated via cases already discussed in the literature, and then develop a particular version of relationism couched in the possible worlds framework. The resulting theory avoids the problems facing its non-relationist rivals, and yields a natural account of the truth conditions of (1), truth conditions which can be generated in a compositional manner by a version of dynamic semantics. The theory also helps us to cleanly separate semantic questions about intentional identity from metasemantic ones.
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来源期刊
MIND
MIND PHILOSOPHY-
CiteScore
3.10
自引率
5.60%
发文量
47
期刊介绍: Mind has long been a leading journal in philosophy. For well over 100 years it has presented the best of cutting edge thought from epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of language, philosophy of logic, and philosophy of mind. Mind continues its tradition of excellence today. Mind has always enjoyed a strong reputation for the high standards established by its editors and receives around 350 submissions each year. The editor seeks advice from a large number of expert referees, including members of the network of Associate Editors and his international advisers. Mind is published quarterly.
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