贝克尔-德格鲁特-马沙克机制中的参照依赖、预期和锚定问题

IF 0.9 4区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS Theory and Decision Pub Date : 2024-06-02 DOI:10.1007/s11238-024-09989-5
Achilleas Vassilopoulos, Andreas C. Drichoutis, Rodolfo M. Nayga
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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们探讨了与贝克尔-德格鲁特-马沙克(BDM)机制中的竞标行为相关的几个行为问题;该机制是实验经济学和估价研究中的一种流行机制。通过操纵随机约束价和框架,我们发现出价会受到实验者选择的影响。我们的理论框架表明,处理效果与基于预期的参考点、锚定最高价格以及 Novemsky 和 Kahneman(2005 年)的无损失购买假说是一致的。总之,我们的理论和实验结果都证实,该机制与激励机制不兼容,因此,以前关于产品估值的结果以及利用该机制确定的各种治疗效果,都应被解释为是以特定设计变量的选择为条件的。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。

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Reference dependence, expectations and anchoring in the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism

We explore several behavioral issues associated with bidding behavior in the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) mechanism; a popular mechanism in experimental economics and valuation research. By manipulating the random binding price and framing, we find that bids are affected by the choices made by experimenters. Our theoretical framework, shows that the treatment effects are consistent with an attachment to expectations-based reference points, anchoring on the highest price, as well as the no-loss-in-buying hypothesis of Novemsky and Kahneman (2005). Overall, our theory and experimental results confirm that the mechanism is not incentive compatible and thus previous results regarding product valuations, as well as various treatment effects identified using the mechanism, should be interpreted as conditional on the particular choice of design variables.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.60
自引率
0.00%
发文量
62
期刊介绍: The field of decision has been investigated from many sides. However, research programs relevant to decision making in psychology, management science, economics, the theory of games, statistics, operations research, artificial intelligence, cognitive science and analytical philosophy have remained separate. Theory and Decision is devoted to all aspects of decision making belonging to such programs, but addresses also possible cross-fertilizations between these disciplines which would represent effective advances in knowledge. The purpose of the journal is to let the engineering of choice gradually emerge both for individual and for collective decision making. Formalized treatments will be favoured, to the extent that they provide new insights into the issues raised and an appropriate modeling of the situation considered. Due to its growing importance, expermentation in decision making as well as its links to the cognitive sciences will be granted special attention by Theory and Decision. Of particular interest are: Preference and belief modeling, Experimental decision making under risk or under uncertainty, Decision analysis, multicriteria decision modeling, Game theory, negotiation theory, collective decision making, social choice, Rationality, cognitive processes and interactive decision making, Methodology of the decision sciences. Applications to various problems in management and organization science, economics and finance, computer-supported decision schemes, will be welcome as long as they bear on sufficiently general cases. Analysis of actual decision making processes are also relevant topics for the journal, whether pertaining to individual, collective or negotiatory approaches; to private decisions or public policies; to operations or to strategic choices. Officially cited as: Theory Decis
期刊最新文献
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