{"title":"正当性、事实性、规范性","authors":"David Liakos","doi":"10.3366/drt.2024.0340","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In Donner le temps II, Derrida argues that Heidegger is a thinker of ‘propriety’, which suggests that Heidegger is committed to a metaphysical strategy of assigning essential characteristics to entities and to being. This essay interrogates this claim from Derrida’s reading in Donner le temps II of Heidegger’s analytic of Dasein. Drawing on Giorgio Agamben’s critique of Derrida on this issue, we will distinguish propriety from facticity. This investigation reveals that Heidegger conceives of Dasein as facing a range of possible commitments which can become determinate but are not determined. In turn, this conception of facticity provides the basis for Heidegger’s thinking of normativity, that is, a measure for success or failure which does not assign propriety to Dasein’s character, as Steven Crowell has argued. The essay concludes that Derrida’s critique of propriety and departure from phenomenology complicate the possibility of a viable deconstructive conception of normativity.","PeriodicalId":42836,"journal":{"name":"Derrida Today","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3000,"publicationDate":"2024-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Propriety, Facticity, Normativity\",\"authors\":\"David Liakos\",\"doi\":\"10.3366/drt.2024.0340\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"In Donner le temps II, Derrida argues that Heidegger is a thinker of ‘propriety’, which suggests that Heidegger is committed to a metaphysical strategy of assigning essential characteristics to entities and to being. This essay interrogates this claim from Derrida’s reading in Donner le temps II of Heidegger’s analytic of Dasein. Drawing on Giorgio Agamben’s critique of Derrida on this issue, we will distinguish propriety from facticity. This investigation reveals that Heidegger conceives of Dasein as facing a range of possible commitments which can become determinate but are not determined. In turn, this conception of facticity provides the basis for Heidegger’s thinking of normativity, that is, a measure for success or failure which does not assign propriety to Dasein’s character, as Steven Crowell has argued. The essay concludes that Derrida’s critique of propriety and departure from phenomenology complicate the possibility of a viable deconstructive conception of normativity.\",\"PeriodicalId\":42836,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Derrida Today\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.3000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-06-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Derrida Today\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.3366/drt.2024.0340\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"0\",\"JCRName\":\"PHILOSOPHY\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Derrida Today","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.3366/drt.2024.0340","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
摘要
在《Donner le temps II》中,德里达认为海德格尔是一位 "本体论 "思想家,这表明海德格尔致力于一种形而上学的策略,为实体和存在赋予本质特征。这篇文章从德里达在《Donner le temps II》中对海德格尔的 "Dasein "分析的解读出发,对这一说法提出了质疑。借鉴乔治-阿甘本(Giorgio Agamben)在这个问题上对德里达的批判,我们将区分妥当性与事实性。这一研究揭示出,海德格尔将 "Dasein "视为面临一系列可能的承诺,这些承诺可以成为确定的,但却不是确定的。反过来,这种关于事实性的概念为海德格尔关于规范性的思考提供了基础,也就是说,正如史蒂文-克劳尔(Steven Crowell)所论证的那样,规范性是衡量成败的标准,它并不赋予达辛的特性以妥当性。文章的结论是,德里达对适当性的批判和对现象学的背离,使可行的规范性解构概念变得更加复杂。
In Donner le temps II, Derrida argues that Heidegger is a thinker of ‘propriety’, which suggests that Heidegger is committed to a metaphysical strategy of assigning essential characteristics to entities and to being. This essay interrogates this claim from Derrida’s reading in Donner le temps II of Heidegger’s analytic of Dasein. Drawing on Giorgio Agamben’s critique of Derrida on this issue, we will distinguish propriety from facticity. This investigation reveals that Heidegger conceives of Dasein as facing a range of possible commitments which can become determinate but are not determined. In turn, this conception of facticity provides the basis for Heidegger’s thinking of normativity, that is, a measure for success or failure which does not assign propriety to Dasein’s character, as Steven Crowell has argued. The essay concludes that Derrida’s critique of propriety and departure from phenomenology complicate the possibility of a viable deconstructive conception of normativity.