Beginning right at the start of the recently published volume II of Donner le temps, at its ‘bord’ or ‘boarding’ upon or out of a calmy oceanic surface, this essay examines the functions and movements of distinct surfaces in between Heidegger and Derrida. Confronting thus the tradition of the ‘Grund’, ‘Abgrund’, ‘Urgrund’, ‘Ungrund’, with the khôra-like surface of archi-writing and dissemination, the essay proposes an investigation of the philosophical and writerly space of Derrida/Heidegger not through their marks and letters, but instead through the different surfaces of inscription and – simultaneous – effacement as the ‘proper places’ of thought and experience, of Destruktion and deconstruction.
{"title":"Between the Ocean and the Ground: Giving Surfaces","authors":"James Martell","doi":"10.3366/drt.2024.0341","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3366/drt.2024.0341","url":null,"abstract":"Beginning right at the start of the recently published volume II of Donner le temps, at its ‘bord’ or ‘boarding’ upon or out of a calmy oceanic surface, this essay examines the functions and movements of distinct surfaces in between Heidegger and Derrida. Confronting thus the tradition of the ‘Grund’, ‘Abgrund’, ‘Urgrund’, ‘Ungrund’, with the khôra-like surface of archi-writing and dissemination, the essay proposes an investigation of the philosophical and writerly space of Derrida/Heidegger not through their marks and letters, but instead through the different surfaces of inscription and – simultaneous – effacement as the ‘proper places’ of thought and experience, of Destruktion and deconstruction.","PeriodicalId":42836,"journal":{"name":"Derrida Today","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2024-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141231996","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"To Give – Time (Sixth Session)","authors":"Jacques Derrida","doi":"10.3366/drt.2024.0336","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3366/drt.2024.0336","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":42836,"journal":{"name":"Derrida Today","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2024-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141276585","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this article, I focus on the reading of Heidegger's Kant that Derrida offers in his recently published 1978-9 seminar Donner le temps II (§§12–3). Here Derrida tracks across Heidegger's text the auto-affective or auto-dative structure (namely, the originary synthesis of spontaneity and receptivity) in which the Kantian conceptions of the experience of time and of transcendental imagination converge, and which is seen as scandalously underpinning the conception of respect. In particular, I draw attention to the moment in which Derrida originally accounts for the structure of the Kantian respect as the movement of abandonment or delivery over to the event which he also ascribes to other figures of freedom (or unconditionality without sovereignty) explored in his later writings. My hypothesis is that, in doing so, Derrida may be building a bridge between two thoughts of imagination: on the one hand, imagination as a figure of his early differance, and, on the other hand, imagination as the non-sovereign freedom that undergirds his late work on sovereignty.
在本文中，我将重点讨论德里达在其最近出版的 1978-9 年研讨会《Donner le temps II》（§§12-3）中对海德格尔的康德的解读。在这里，德里达在海德格尔的文本中追踪了康德关于时间体验和超验想象力的概念所汇聚的自体情感或自体表意结构（即自发性和接受性的原初综合），并将其视为尊重概念的丑陋基础。特别是，我提请注意德里达最初将康德式尊重的结构解释为放弃或交付给事件的运动的那一刻，他在后来的著作中也将这种运动归结为其他自由（或无主权的无条件性）的形象。我的假设是，德里达这样做可能是在两种关于想象力的思想之间架起了一座桥梁：一方面，想象力是他早期差异的形象，另一方面，想象力是支撑他晚期关于主权的著作的非主权自由。
{"title":"Gift and Respect: Heidegger's Kant as Taught by Derrida","authors":"Mauro Senatore","doi":"10.3366/drt.2024.0338","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3366/drt.2024.0338","url":null,"abstract":"In this article, I focus on the reading of Heidegger's Kant that Derrida offers in his recently published 1978-9 seminar Donner le temps II (§§12–3). Here Derrida tracks across Heidegger's text the auto-affective or auto-dative structure (namely, the originary synthesis of spontaneity and receptivity) in which the Kantian conceptions of the experience of time and of transcendental imagination converge, and which is seen as scandalously underpinning the conception of respect. In particular, I draw attention to the moment in which Derrida originally accounts for the structure of the Kantian respect as the movement of abandonment or delivery over to the event which he also ascribes to other figures of freedom (or unconditionality without sovereignty) explored in his later writings. My hypothesis is that, in doing so, Derrida may be building a bridge between two thoughts of imagination: on the one hand, imagination as a figure of his early differance, and, on the other hand, imagination as the non-sovereign freedom that undergirds his late work on sovereignty.","PeriodicalId":42836,"journal":{"name":"Derrida Today","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2024-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141233520","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In Donner le temps II, Derrida argues that Heidegger is a thinker of ‘propriety’, which suggests that Heidegger is committed to a metaphysical strategy of assigning essential characteristics to entities and to being. This essay interrogates this claim from Derrida’s reading in Donner le temps II of Heidegger’s analytic of Dasein. Drawing on Giorgio Agamben’s critique of Derrida on this issue, we will distinguish propriety from facticity. This investigation reveals that Heidegger conceives of Dasein as facing a range of possible commitments which can become determinate but are not determined. In turn, this conception of facticity provides the basis for Heidegger’s thinking of normativity, that is, a measure for success or failure which does not assign propriety to Dasein’s character, as Steven Crowell has argued. The essay concludes that Derrida’s critique of propriety and departure from phenomenology complicate the possibility of a viable deconstructive conception of normativity.
在《Donner le temps II》中，德里达认为海德格尔是一位 "本体论 "思想家，这表明海德格尔致力于一种形而上学的策略，为实体和存在赋予本质特征。这篇文章从德里达在《Donner le temps II》中对海德格尔的 "Dasein "分析的解读出发，对这一说法提出了质疑。借鉴乔治-阿甘本（Giorgio Agamben）在这个问题上对德里达的批判，我们将区分妥当性与事实性。这一研究揭示出，海德格尔将 "Dasein "视为面临一系列可能的承诺，这些承诺可以成为确定的，但却不是确定的。反过来，这种关于事实性的概念为海德格尔关于规范性的思考提供了基础，也就是说，正如史蒂文-克劳尔（Steven Crowell）所论证的那样，规范性是衡量成败的标准，它并不赋予达辛的特性以妥当性。文章的结论是，德里达对适当性的批判和对现象学的背离，使可行的规范性解构概念变得更加复杂。
{"title":"Propriety, Facticity, Normativity","authors":"David Liakos","doi":"10.3366/drt.2024.0340","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3366/drt.2024.0340","url":null,"abstract":"In Donner le temps II, Derrida argues that Heidegger is a thinker of ‘propriety’, which suggests that Heidegger is committed to a metaphysical strategy of assigning essential characteristics to entities and to being. This essay interrogates this claim from Derrida’s reading in Donner le temps II of Heidegger’s analytic of Dasein. Drawing on Giorgio Agamben’s critique of Derrida on this issue, we will distinguish propriety from facticity. This investigation reveals that Heidegger conceives of Dasein as facing a range of possible commitments which can become determinate but are not determined. In turn, this conception of facticity provides the basis for Heidegger’s thinking of normativity, that is, a measure for success or failure which does not assign propriety to Dasein’s character, as Steven Crowell has argued. The essay concludes that Derrida’s critique of propriety and departure from phenomenology complicate the possibility of a viable deconstructive conception of normativity.","PeriodicalId":42836,"journal":{"name":"Derrida Today","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2024-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141231433","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Introduction to ‘Session Six’ of ‘Donner – le temps’ (Given Time vol. 2)","authors":"Michael Portal","doi":"10.3366/drt.2024.0335","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3366/drt.2024.0335","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":42836,"journal":{"name":"Derrida Today","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2024-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141234112","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Special Issue Introduction","authors":"Adam R. Rosenthal, Michael Portal","doi":"10.3366/drt.2024.0334","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3366/drt.2024.0334","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":42836,"journal":{"name":"Derrida Today","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2024-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141232103","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In his recently published Donner le temps II, Derrida raises, but does not develop, the possibility that Heidegger's notion of Gelassenheit (‘releasement’, ‘letting-be’) might escape the economic confines of exchange, debt, and repayment and therefore qualify as a pure gift. In this paper, I explore this possibility, explaining that Gelassenheit would have to be understood, first, not primarily as a human comportment but at the level of being itself, second, beyond appropriation, and third, as ‘without why’. If Heidegger's focus on appropriation in ‘Time and Being’ remains entangled in the economy of exchange (as Derrida insinuates in the final session of Donner le temps II), Heidegger's anarchic treatment of ‘letting’ ( laisser, Lassen) in the final session of his 1969 seminar in Le Thor opens instead onto a ‘pure giving’ ( pur donner, reines Geben).
在最近出版的《Donner le temps II》中，德里达提出了一种可能性，即海德格尔的 "Gelassenheit"（"释放"、"让存在"）概念可能会摆脱交换、债务和偿还的经济限制，从而成为一种纯粹的礼物，但他并未就此展开论述。在本文中，我将探讨这种可能性，并解释说，"释放 "首先不应被理解为人类的行为举止，而应被理解为存在本身；其次，"释放 "应超越 "占有"；第三，"释放 "应被理解为 "没有原因"。如果说海德格尔在《时间与存在》中对 "占有 "的关注仍然与交换经济纠缠在一起（正如德里达在《Donner le temps II》最后一课中所暗示的那样），那么，海德格尔在其1969年在勒索尔（Le Thor）的研讨会最后一课中对 "让"（laisser, Lassen）的无政府主义处理则开启了一种 "纯粹的给予"（pur donner, reines Geben）。
{"title":"The (Anarchic) Gift of Gelassenheit: On an Undeveloped Motif in Derrida's Donner le temps II","authors":"Ian Alexander Moore","doi":"10.3366/drt.2024.0337","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3366/drt.2024.0337","url":null,"abstract":"In his recently published Donner le temps II, Derrida raises, but does not develop, the possibility that Heidegger's notion of Gelassenheit (‘releasement’, ‘letting-be’) might escape the economic confines of exchange, debt, and repayment and therefore qualify as a pure gift. In this paper, I explore this possibility, explaining that Gelassenheit would have to be understood, first, not primarily as a human comportment but at the level of being itself, second, beyond appropriation, and third, as ‘without why’. If Heidegger's focus on appropriation in ‘Time and Being’ remains entangled in the economy of exchange (as Derrida insinuates in the final session of Donner le temps II), Heidegger's anarchic treatment of ‘letting’ ( laisser, Lassen) in the final session of his 1969 seminar in Le Thor opens instead onto a ‘pure giving’ ( pur donner, reines Geben).","PeriodicalId":42836,"journal":{"name":"Derrida Today","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2024-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141230849","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This essay attempts to offer some reflections on what it is that Jacques Derrida found uncomfortable in Martin Heidegger’s thought at the level of fundamental gestures. The region of disagreement is located in Derrida’s self-identification in a marrano register at an autographic level. This paper studies the notions of propriation and expropriation in Heidegger’s late texts and compares them to Derrida’s ‘uncanny propriation’ as a marrano notion. I offer four propositions regarding Derrida’s marranismo, which I align with Derrida’s proposal for desecularization, tentatively described as a ‘messianic engagement with the khora’. I conclude with a proposal for the development of ontic models of marrano action that would antecede the theory/practice divide.
{"title":"The Keep. Uncanny Propriation: Derrida’s Marrano Objection","authors":"Alberto Moreiras","doi":"10.3366/drt.2024.0339","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3366/drt.2024.0339","url":null,"abstract":"This essay attempts to offer some reflections on what it is that Jacques Derrida found uncomfortable in Martin Heidegger’s thought at the level of fundamental gestures. The region of disagreement is located in Derrida’s self-identification in a marrano register at an autographic level. This paper studies the notions of propriation and expropriation in Heidegger’s late texts and compares them to Derrida’s ‘uncanny propriation’ as a marrano notion. I offer four propositions regarding Derrida’s marranismo, which I align with Derrida’s proposal for desecularization, tentatively described as a ‘messianic engagement with the khora’. I conclude with a proposal for the development of ontic models of marrano action that would antecede the theory/practice divide.","PeriodicalId":42836,"journal":{"name":"Derrida Today","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2024-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141231578","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Commentators agree that Derrida's criteria for an event were stringent: it had to be unique, unpredictable and unanticipatable; it must come as a surprise that defies all conceptualization, comprehension, appropriation. Can any historical occurrence pass such rigorous tests and be considered an event? The question now extends to whether Derrida's writings or life should constitute an event. This article traces Derrida's use of the word ‘event’ or ‘événement’ from ‘Signature Event Context’ and early readings of Nietzsche, Blanchot, and Benjamin through his 2001 paper, ‘The Impossible Possibility of Saying the Event’. Analysis shows that where Derrida appears to concede the independent existence of past events this illusion is created linguistically by supplements, the future anterior tense, and speech acts. His unsuccessful attempt to exemplify ‘events’ that were distinguishable from merely ‘what happens’ assimilates them into the latter category, which he likened to ‘rain’, a banal, minimal catachresis of nothing. The implication is that what we call history resembles a Beckett-like condition of apparent insight that reverts, on reflection, to emptiness.
{"title":"The Derridean Event: History, Including the Life and Work of Derrida, as Rain","authors":"Christopher Morris","doi":"10.3366/drt.2024.0326","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3366/drt.2024.0326","url":null,"abstract":"Commentators agree that Derrida's criteria for an event were stringent: it had to be unique, unpredictable and unanticipatable; it must come as a surprise that defies all conceptualization, comprehension, appropriation. Can any historical occurrence pass such rigorous tests and be considered an event? The question now extends to whether Derrida's writings or life should constitute an event. This article traces Derrida's use of the word ‘event’ or ‘événement’ from ‘Signature Event Context’ and early readings of Nietzsche, Blanchot, and Benjamin through his 2001 paper, ‘The Impossible Possibility of Saying the Event’. Analysis shows that where Derrida appears to concede the independent existence of past events this illusion is created linguistically by supplements, the future anterior tense, and speech acts. His unsuccessful attempt to exemplify ‘events’ that were distinguishable from merely ‘what happens’ assimilates them into the latter category, which he likened to ‘rain’, a banal, minimal catachresis of nothing. The implication is that what we call history resembles a Beckett-like condition of apparent insight that reverts, on reflection, to emptiness.","PeriodicalId":42836,"journal":{"name":"Derrida Today","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2024-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139684188","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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