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引用次数: 0
摘要
布罗德(C. D. Broad)认为,当一个强突现整体的组成成分从整体中孤立出来,或者当这些组成成分是其他整体的组成成分时,就不可能从对其组成成分属性的完整了解中推导出该整体的属性。埃兰诺-泰勒提出了 "崩溃问题"。宏观层面的属性 p 理应是在其微观层面的组成部分按关系 r 结合时产生的。然而,每个组成部分都有一个属性,即它可以与 r 中的其他组成部分结合产生 p。本文认为,r 所需的信息量在物理上是不可能的。强涌现不会崩溃。但 "崩溃问题 "会。相信强涌现是有充分理由的。只要在物理上无法推导出特定关系中的各组成部分如何结合才能产生一个具有p的整体,强新现就会出现。强新现现象无处不在:
It is impossible to deduce the properties of a strongly emergent whole from a complete knowledge of the properties of its constituents, according to C. D. Broad, when those constituents are isolated from the whole or when they are constituents of other wholes. Elanor Taylor proposes the Collapse Problem. Macro-level property p supposedly emerges when its micro-level components combine in relation r. However, each component has the property that it can combine with the others in r to produce p. Broad’s nondeducibility criterion is not met. This article argues that the amount of information required for r is physically impossible. Strong Emergence does not collapse. But the Collapse Problem does. Belief in Strong Emergence is strongly warranted. Strong Emergence occurs whenever it is physically impossible to deduce how components, in a specific relation, would combine to produce a whole with p. Almost always, that is impossible. Strong Emergence is ubiquitous.
期刊介绍:
The European Journal for Philosophy of Science publishes groundbreaking works that can deepen understanding of the concepts and methods of the sciences, as they explore increasingly many facets of the world we live in. It is of direct interest to philosophers of science coming from different perspectives, as well as scientists, citizens and policymakers. The journal is interested in articles from all traditions and all backgrounds, as long as they engage with the sciences in a constructive, and critical, way. The journal represents the various longstanding European philosophical traditions engaging with the sciences, but welcomes articles from every part of the world.