{"title":"寻找差距:人工智能、负责任的机构和脆弱性","authors":"Shannon Vallor, Tillmann Vierkant","doi":"10.1007/s11023-024-09674-0","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>The <i>responsibility gap</i>, commonly described as a core challenge for the effective governance of, and trust in, AI and autonomous systems (AI/AS), is traditionally associated with a failure of the epistemic and/or the control condition of moral responsibility: the ability to know what we are doing and exercise competent control over this doing. Yet these two conditions are a red herring when it comes to understanding the responsibility challenges presented by AI/AS, since evidence from the cognitive sciences shows that individual humans face very similar responsibility challenges with regard to these two conditions. While the problems of epistemic opacity and attenuated behaviour control are not unique to AI/AS technologies (though they can be exacerbated by them), we show that we can learn important lessons for AI/AS development and governance from how philosophers have recently revised the traditional concept of moral responsibility in response to these challenges to responsible human agency from the cognitive sciences. The resulting instrumentalist views of responsibility, which emphasize the forward-looking and flexible role of agency cultivation, hold considerable promise for integrating AI/AS into a healthy moral ecology. We note that there nevertheless <i>is</i> a gap in AI/AS responsibility that has yet to be extensively studied and addressed, one grounded in a relational asymmetry of <i>vulnerability</i> between human agents and sociotechnical systems like AI/AS. In the conclusion of this paper we note that attention to this vulnerability gap must inform and enable future attempts to construct trustworthy AI/AS systems and preserve the conditions for responsible human agency.</p>","PeriodicalId":51133,"journal":{"name":"Minds and Machines","volume":"39 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.2000,"publicationDate":"2024-06-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Find the Gap: AI, Responsible Agency and Vulnerability\",\"authors\":\"Shannon Vallor, Tillmann Vierkant\",\"doi\":\"10.1007/s11023-024-09674-0\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p>The <i>responsibility gap</i>, commonly described as a core challenge for the effective governance of, and trust in, AI and autonomous systems (AI/AS), is traditionally associated with a failure of the epistemic and/or the control condition of moral responsibility: the ability to know what we are doing and exercise competent control over this doing. Yet these two conditions are a red herring when it comes to understanding the responsibility challenges presented by AI/AS, since evidence from the cognitive sciences shows that individual humans face very similar responsibility challenges with regard to these two conditions. While the problems of epistemic opacity and attenuated behaviour control are not unique to AI/AS technologies (though they can be exacerbated by them), we show that we can learn important lessons for AI/AS development and governance from how philosophers have recently revised the traditional concept of moral responsibility in response to these challenges to responsible human agency from the cognitive sciences. The resulting instrumentalist views of responsibility, which emphasize the forward-looking and flexible role of agency cultivation, hold considerable promise for integrating AI/AS into a healthy moral ecology. We note that there nevertheless <i>is</i> a gap in AI/AS responsibility that has yet to be extensively studied and addressed, one grounded in a relational asymmetry of <i>vulnerability</i> between human agents and sociotechnical systems like AI/AS. In the conclusion of this paper we note that attention to this vulnerability gap must inform and enable future attempts to construct trustworthy AI/AS systems and preserve the conditions for responsible human agency.</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":51133,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Minds and Machines\",\"volume\":\"39 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":4.2000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-06-05\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Minds and Machines\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"94\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11023-024-09674-0\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"计算机科学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"COMPUTER SCIENCE, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Minds and Machines","FirstCategoryId":"94","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11023-024-09674-0","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"COMPUTER SCIENCE, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
Find the Gap: AI, Responsible Agency and Vulnerability
The responsibility gap, commonly described as a core challenge for the effective governance of, and trust in, AI and autonomous systems (AI/AS), is traditionally associated with a failure of the epistemic and/or the control condition of moral responsibility: the ability to know what we are doing and exercise competent control over this doing. Yet these two conditions are a red herring when it comes to understanding the responsibility challenges presented by AI/AS, since evidence from the cognitive sciences shows that individual humans face very similar responsibility challenges with regard to these two conditions. While the problems of epistemic opacity and attenuated behaviour control are not unique to AI/AS technologies (though they can be exacerbated by them), we show that we can learn important lessons for AI/AS development and governance from how philosophers have recently revised the traditional concept of moral responsibility in response to these challenges to responsible human agency from the cognitive sciences. The resulting instrumentalist views of responsibility, which emphasize the forward-looking and flexible role of agency cultivation, hold considerable promise for integrating AI/AS into a healthy moral ecology. We note that there nevertheless is a gap in AI/AS responsibility that has yet to be extensively studied and addressed, one grounded in a relational asymmetry of vulnerability between human agents and sociotechnical systems like AI/AS. In the conclusion of this paper we note that attention to this vulnerability gap must inform and enable future attempts to construct trustworthy AI/AS systems and preserve the conditions for responsible human agency.
期刊介绍:
Minds and Machines, affiliated with the Society for Machines and Mentality, serves as a platform for fostering critical dialogue between the AI and philosophical communities. With a focus on problems of shared interest, the journal actively encourages discussions on the philosophical aspects of computer science.
Offering a global forum, Minds and Machines provides a space to debate and explore important and contentious issues within its editorial focus. The journal presents special editions dedicated to specific topics, invites critical responses to previously published works, and features review essays addressing current problem scenarios.
By facilitating a diverse range of perspectives, Minds and Machines encourages a reevaluation of the status quo and the development of new insights. Through this collaborative approach, the journal aims to bridge the gap between AI and philosophy, fostering a tradition of critique and ensuring these fields remain connected and relevant.