知识差距论证

IF 0.5 4区哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY PHILOSOPHIA Pub Date : 2024-06-04 DOI:10.1007/s11406-024-00732-6

Barbara Montero

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引用次数: 0

摘要

阿尔特（《意识问题：从知识论到罗素一元论》，GB：牛津大学出版社，2023 年）提出了一个令人惊讶的论点：尽管杰克逊的知识论遭到了包括弗兰克-杰克逊本人在内的哲学家们的广泛反对，但杰克逊的知识论却取得了成功。阿尔特对杰克逊论证的辩护不仅令人吃惊，也令人兴奋：知识论证如果是合理的，就彰显了扶手椅哲学的力量，即纯粹思维得出关于世界的实质性结论的力量。与此相反，我的目标是为一些不足为奇、平淡无奇的事情立论：知识论证并不成功，或者说，阿尔特为知识论证所做的辩护并不具有说服力。我的论点是一个典型的文件柜式论点，但它的优点在于它是正确的，或者说我是这么认为的，并希望说明为什么你也应该这么认为。

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The Gap in the Knowledge Argument

Alter (The Matter of Consciousness: From the Knowledge Argument to Russellian Monism, GB: Oxford University Pres, 2023) argues for something surprising: despite being widely rejected by philosophers, including Frank Jackson himself, Jackson’s knowledge argument succeeds. Alter’s defense of Jackson’s argument is not only surprising; it’s also exciting: the knowledge argument, if it’s sound, underscores the power of armchair philosophy, the power of pure thought to arrive at substantial conclusions about the world. In contrast, I aim to make a case for something unsurprising and unexciting: that the knowledge argument does not succeed, or, even less far-reaching, that Alter’s defense of it is not persuasive. Mine is a classic file-drawer thesis, but what it has going for it is that it’s true, or so I think, and hope to illustrate why you should too.

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来源期刊

PHILOSOPHIA PHILOSOPHY-

CiteScore

0.90

自引率

20.00%

发文量

141

期刊介绍： Founded in 1971, Philosophia is a much-respected journal that has provided a platform to many well-known philosophers, including Kenneth Arrow, A.J. Ayer, Roderick Chisholm, Bas van Fraassen, William Frankena, P.T. Geach, Alan Gewirth, Jaakko Hintikka, Richard Popkin, W.V.O. Quine, Gilbert Ryle, Marcus Singer, Peter Singer, J.J.C. Smart, P.F. Strawson, and many others. Philosophia also published papers of Ludwig Wittgenstein and Rudolf Carnap. Philosophia is an international journal in scope, submissions and readership. The journal publishes contributions fitting within various philosophical traditions, but manifests a preference of the analytic tradition in the broad sense of commitment to clarity and responsibility. Besides papers in the traditional subfields of philosophy and its history, Philosophia also publishes work on topical subjects such as racism, silence of God, terrorism, the nature of philosophy, emotion, AIDS, scientific discovery, punishment, modality, and institutional theory of art. Philosophia welcomes a wide range of contributions to academic philosophy, covering all fields of philosophy. Contributions to the journal may take the form of topical papers, philosophical surveys of literature, symposia papers, short discussion notes, puzzles, profiles, book reviews and more extensive critical studies of new books. The journal includes a ''books revisited'' section where a book and its impact are reconsidered a decade or more after its appearance. Double-blind review procedure The journal follows a double-blind reviewing procedure. Authors are therefore requested to place their name and affiliation on a separate page. Self-identifying citations and references in the article text should either be avoided or left blank when manuscripts are first submitted. Authors are responsible for reinserting self-identifying citations and references when manuscripts are prepared for final submission.Please read our Editorial Policies carefully before you submit your paper to this journal https://www.springer.com/gp/editorial-policies