如何促进农民使用绿色农药?基于 "政府-农民-消费者 "的进化博弈分析

Xiaofeng Wang, Xiaojun Cui, Xiaolong Sun
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摘要

绿色农药作为减少农药使用的重要手段,在促进环境和食品安全方面发挥着至关重要的作用。然而,中国绿色农药使用政策的效果却不尽如人意。现有研究主要从静态和单一主体的角度研究绿色农药使用的政策促进问题。然而,绿色农药使用行为是一个受政府、农民和消费者等多重因素影响的动态过程。本文从动态策略演化的角度出发,建立了政府、农民和消费者三方博弈演化模型,并探讨了影响绿色农药使用过程中三方博弈策略稳定性的演化条件。结果表明:1)通过不同的合作模式,政府、农民和消费者可以演化到稳定状态。2)将政府对绿色农产品市场的监管力度控制在合理范围内有助于农民施用绿色农药。3)用户对高品质蔬菜的偏好将提高绿色产品的市场售价。4)保持政府对绿色农药的生态补贴,有利于激发农民使用绿色农药的积极性。因此,政府应适当加强生态补贴和市场监管,引导消费者的绿色消费行为,鼓励农民使用绿色农药。
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How to promote the application of green pesticides by farmers? Evolutionary game analysis based on “government–farmer–consumer”
Green pesticide use, as a key means to reduce pesticide use, plays a crucial role in promoting environmental and food safety. However, the effectiveness of green pesticide use policies in China falls short of expectations. Existing research mainly examines the policy promotion issues of green pesticide use from a static and single-agent perspective. However, green pesticide use behavior is a dynamic process influenced by multiple factors, including the government, farmers, and consumers. This paper builds an evolutionary tripartite game model of the government, farmers, and consumers from the perspective of dynamic strategy evolution and explores the evolutionary conditions that affect the stability of the tripartite game strategy during green pesticide application. The results show that 1) through different partnership models, the government, farmers, and consumers can evolve to a stable state. 2) Keeping the government’s regulatory intensity in the market for green agricultural products within a reasonable range will help farmers apply green pesticides. 3) Users’ preference for high-quality vegetables will increase the market selling price of green products. 4) Maintaining the government’s ecological subsidies for green pesticides will help stimulate farmers’ enthusiasm for using green pesticides. Therefore, the government should appropriately strengthen ecological subsidies and market supervision, guide consumers’ green consumption behavior, and encourage farmers to use green pesticides.
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