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引用次数: 0
摘要
投资决策的短期化往往会导致公司业绩不佳，但过长的投资期限也会降低内部灵活性，从而损害业绩。本研究调查了投资期限与绩效之间的二次方倒 U 型关系。在代理理论和资源约束论证的基础上，我们提出组织松弛会调节投资期限与企业绩效之间的关系。对于短投资期限而言，松弛代表了本可用于投资的闲置资源，从而导致绩效下降。对于长投资期限而言，闲置资源有助于支付意外支出，从而提高企业绩效。我们在公用事业和零售贸易行业的大量欧洲私营企业样本中发现，我们的理论得到了实证支持。
Investment horizon, slack resources, and firm performance: Evidence from privately held european firms
Short-termism in investment decisions often results in poor firm performance, though excessively long investments can also harm performance by reducing internal flexibility. This study investigated a quadratic, inverted U-shaped relationship between investment horizon and performance. Building on agency theory and resource-constraint arguments, we proposed that organizational slack moderates the relationship between investment horizon and firm performance. For short investment horizons, slack represented unused resources that could have been invested, thus leading to lower performance. For long investment horizons, slack helped cover unanticipated expenses and increased firm performance. We found empirical support for our theory in a large sample of privately held European firms in the utilities and retail trade industries.
期刊介绍：
Long Range Planning (LRP) is an internationally renowned journal specializing in the field of strategic management. Since its establishment in 1968, the journal has consistently published original research, garnering a strong reputation among academics. LRP actively encourages the submission of articles that involve empirical research and theoretical perspectives, including studies that provide critical assessments and analysis of the current state of knowledge in crucial strategic areas. The primary user base of LRP primarily comprises individuals from academic backgrounds, with the journal playing a dual role within this community. Firstly, it serves as a platform for the dissemination of research findings among academic researchers. Secondly, it serves as a channel for the transmission of ideas that can be effectively utilized in educational settings. The articles published in LRP cater to a diverse audience, including practicing managers and students in professional programs. While some articles may focus on practical applications, others may primarily target academic researchers. LRP adopts an inclusive approach to empirical research, accepting studies that draw on various methodologies such as primary survey data, archival data, case studies, and recognized approaches to data collection.
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