{"title":"中东和乌克兰战争:恐惧与机遇并存","authors":"Jeffrey Mankoff","doi":"10.1111/mepo.12738","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>While the ambivalence among Middle Eastern states about the war in Ukraine stems from multiple sources, Russian influence is a significant, if underappreciated, factor. Several of these countries see Moscow as an external balancer and hedge against the possibility of a broader US pullback from the region. At the same time, Russia maintains significant coercive capabilities thanks to its military presence in Syria and burgeoning strategic partnership with Iran. Many aspiring regional powers are also sympathetic to Moscow's calls for an international order less centered on the West. This article analyzes these concerns and perceptions, and it shows how they have shaped the way states in the region have responded to the invasion of Ukraine. Broadly speaking, these states see it as a peripheral concern—especially following the outbreak of war between Israel and Hamas in October 2023—though one that could destabilize the region by stoking inflation or further emboldening Iran. While they are wary of confronting Moscow or facing regional instability, many also directly benefit from Russia's economic decoupling from the West. These countries share President Vladimir Putin's assessment that the war in Ukraine is inaugurating a new age more friendly to middle powers.</p>","PeriodicalId":46060,"journal":{"name":"Middle East Policy","volume":"31 2","pages":"47-66"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6000,"publicationDate":"2024-04-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The Middle East and the Ukraine War: Between Fear and Opportunity\",\"authors\":\"Jeffrey Mankoff\",\"doi\":\"10.1111/mepo.12738\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p>While the ambivalence among Middle Eastern states about the war in Ukraine stems from multiple sources, Russian influence is a significant, if underappreciated, factor. Several of these countries see Moscow as an external balancer and hedge against the possibility of a broader US pullback from the region. At the same time, Russia maintains significant coercive capabilities thanks to its military presence in Syria and burgeoning strategic partnership with Iran. Many aspiring regional powers are also sympathetic to Moscow's calls for an international order less centered on the West. This article analyzes these concerns and perceptions, and it shows how they have shaped the way states in the region have responded to the invasion of Ukraine. Broadly speaking, these states see it as a peripheral concern—especially following the outbreak of war between Israel and Hamas in October 2023—though one that could destabilize the region by stoking inflation or further emboldening Iran. While they are wary of confronting Moscow or facing regional instability, many also directly benefit from Russia's economic decoupling from the West. These countries share President Vladimir Putin's assessment that the war in Ukraine is inaugurating a new age more friendly to middle powers.</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":46060,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Middle East Policy\",\"volume\":\"31 2\",\"pages\":\"47-66\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.6000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-04-30\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Middle East Policy\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"90\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/mepo.12738\",\"RegionNum\":4,\"RegionCategory\":\"社会学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"AREA STUDIES\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Middle East Policy","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/mepo.12738","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"AREA STUDIES","Score":null,"Total":0}
The Middle East and the Ukraine War: Between Fear and Opportunity
While the ambivalence among Middle Eastern states about the war in Ukraine stems from multiple sources, Russian influence is a significant, if underappreciated, factor. Several of these countries see Moscow as an external balancer and hedge against the possibility of a broader US pullback from the region. At the same time, Russia maintains significant coercive capabilities thanks to its military presence in Syria and burgeoning strategic partnership with Iran. Many aspiring regional powers are also sympathetic to Moscow's calls for an international order less centered on the West. This article analyzes these concerns and perceptions, and it shows how they have shaped the way states in the region have responded to the invasion of Ukraine. Broadly speaking, these states see it as a peripheral concern—especially following the outbreak of war between Israel and Hamas in October 2023—though one that could destabilize the region by stoking inflation or further emboldening Iran. While they are wary of confronting Moscow or facing regional instability, many also directly benefit from Russia's economic decoupling from the West. These countries share President Vladimir Putin's assessment that the war in Ukraine is inaugurating a new age more friendly to middle powers.
期刊介绍:
The most frequently cited journal on the Middle East region in the field of international affairs, Middle East Policy has been engaging thoughtful minds for more than 25 years. Since its inception in 1982, the journal has been recognized as a valuable addition to the Washington-based policy discussion. Middle East Policy provides an influential forum for a wide range of views on U.S. interests in the region and the value of the policies that are supposed to promote them.