公司违规行为:公司违规行为会影响银行贷款合同吗?

IF 3.6 2区 经济学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE Journal of Banking & Finance Pub Date : 2024-05-26 DOI:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2024.107225
Huu Nhan Duong , Mariem Khalifa , Ali Sheikhbahaei , Mohammed Aminu Sualihu
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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们研究了公司违规行为对银行贷款合同的影响,结果表明公司违规处罚越高的借款人贷款成本越高。较高的企业违规行为还与更严格的契约和更高的抵押要求相关联。企业违规行为对贷款成本的增加效应主要集中在不透明的企业、市场竞争更激烈的企业或监管不力的企业。违规处罚较高的企业未来业绩较差,违规次数也较多。总之,我们的研究结果表明,银行在做出贷款决策时会考虑企业违规因素,从而从债权人的角度揭示了企业违规的经济后果。
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Corporate noncompliance: Do corporate violations affect bank loan contracting?

We examine the effect of corporate violations on bank loan contracting and document that borrowers with higher corporate violation penalties have higher loan costs. Higher corporate violations are also associated with more restrictive covenants and a higher likelihood of a collateral requirement. The increasing effect of corporate violations on loan costs is concentrated in opaque firms or those subject to more competitive markets or ineffective monitoring. Firms with higher violation penalties have lower future performance and a higher number of future violations. Overall, our results demonstrate that banks factor corporate violations into their lending decisions, thus shedding new light on the economic consequences of corporate violations through the creditors’ lens.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
6.40
自引率
5.40%
发文量
262
期刊介绍: The Journal of Banking and Finance (JBF) publishes theoretical and empirical research papers spanning all the major research fields in finance and banking. The aim of the Journal of Banking and Finance is to provide an outlet for the increasing flow of scholarly research concerning financial institutions and the money and capital markets within which they function. The Journal''s emphasis is on theoretical developments and their implementation, empirical, applied, and policy-oriented research in banking and other domestic and international financial institutions and markets. The Journal''s purpose is to improve communications between, and within, the academic and other research communities and policymakers and operational decision makers at financial institutions - private and public, national and international, and their regulators. The Journal is one of the largest Finance journals, with approximately 1500 new submissions per year, mainly in the following areas: Asset Management; Asset Pricing; Banking (Efficiency, Regulation, Risk Management, Solvency); Behavioural Finance; Capital Structure; Corporate Finance; Corporate Governance; Derivative Pricing and Hedging; Distribution Forecasting with Financial Applications; Entrepreneurial Finance; Empirical Finance; Financial Economics; Financial Markets (Alternative, Bonds, Currency, Commodity, Derivatives, Equity, Energy, Real Estate); FinTech; Fund Management; General Equilibrium Models; High-Frequency Trading; Intermediation; International Finance; Hedge Funds; Investments; Liquidity; Market Efficiency; Market Microstructure; Mergers and Acquisitions; Networks; Performance Analysis; Political Risk; Portfolio Optimization; Regulation of Financial Markets and Institutions; Risk Management and Analysis; Systemic Risk; Term Structure Models; Venture Capital.
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