移动公害的影子成本

IF 5.5 3区 经济学 Q1 BUSINESS Journal of Environmental Economics and Management Pub Date : 2024-06-05 DOI:10.1016/j.jeem.2024.103017
Shu-Chen Tsao , Christopher Costello
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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们对疾病和入侵物种等流动性公害的跨境外部性进行定价。这些跨辖区的边际成本不仅取决于两个辖区的经济、生态和空间特征,还取决于辖区对疫情爆发的战略反应。通过空间动态博弈,我们计算了在马尔可夫-完全纳什均衡的控制努力下,流动性公共疫情爆发的 "跨辖区影子成本"。我们发现,在合理的条件下,来源国有私人动机控制疫情,这可能导致跨辖区影子成本实际上为零的情况。我们还推导出了一国最佳情况下不控制疫情的条件(例如,该国的损失较小),在这种情况下,跨辖区影子成本为正。最后,我们注意到,由于对流动性公共疫情的合作控制比非合作控制带来的福利要高得多,因此我们推导出了一种外部性定价工具,它能完美地将外部性内部化,并促使所有国家进行合作控制。
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The shadow cost of mobile public bads

We price the transboundary externality of mobile public bads such as diseases and invasive species. We focus on the marginal cost to country B of an increase in the stock (i.e. an “outbreak”) in country A. These cross-jurisdiction marginal costs depend not only on economic, ecological, and spatial features of both jurisdictions but also on jurisdictions’ strategic reactions to the outbreak. Using a spatial dynamic game, we calculate the “cross-jurisdiction shadow costs” of an outbreak of mobile public bad under the Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium of control efforts. We find that under reasonable conditions, the source country has private incentives to control the outbreak itself, which can lead to a situation where the cross-jurisdiction shadow cost is, in fact, zero. We also derive conditions where a country optimally fails to control the outbreak (for example, damages in that country are small), in which case cross-jurisdiction shadow costs are positive. Finally, we note that since cooperative control of the mobile public bad delivers substantially higher welfare than non-cooperative control, we derive an externality pricing instrument that perfectly internalizes the externality and induces cooperative control among all countries.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
8.00
自引率
4.30%
发文量
91
期刊介绍: The Journal of Environmental Economics and Management publishes theoretical and empirical papers devoted to specific natural resources and environmental issues. For consideration, papers should (1) contain a substantial element embodying the linkage between economic systems and environmental and natural resources systems or (2) be of substantial importance in understanding the management and/or social control of the economy in its relations with the natural environment. Although the general orientation of the journal is toward economics, interdisciplinary papers by researchers in other fields of interest to resource and environmental economists will be welcomed.
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