{"title":"双语游戏中的进化动态","authors":"Srinivas Arigapudi","doi":"10.1016/j.jedc.2024.104898","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In two-strategy coordination games with distinct payoff- and risk-dominant equilibria, existing results show that the inefficient risk-dominant equilibrium is uniquely selected under many evolutionary dynamics. In the above class of coordination games, we study the effect of introducing a <em>bilingual strategy</em> that is compatible with both of the existing strategies. An agent playing the bilingual strategy incurs an additional <em>adoption cost</em> but never miscoordinates with any other agent. We show that if the adoption cost of the bilingual strategy is low, then the efficient payoff-dominant equilibrium can be uniquely selected under many evolutionary dynamics.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48314,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.9000,"publicationDate":"2024-06-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Evolutionary dynamics in bilingual games\",\"authors\":\"Srinivas Arigapudi\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.jedc.2024.104898\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><p>In two-strategy coordination games with distinct payoff- and risk-dominant equilibria, existing results show that the inefficient risk-dominant equilibrium is uniquely selected under many evolutionary dynamics. In the above class of coordination games, we study the effect of introducing a <em>bilingual strategy</em> that is compatible with both of the existing strategies. An agent playing the bilingual strategy incurs an additional <em>adoption cost</em> but never miscoordinates with any other agent. We show that if the adoption cost of the bilingual strategy is low, then the efficient payoff-dominant equilibrium can be uniquely selected under many evolutionary dynamics.</p></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":48314,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.9000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-06-10\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165188924000903\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165188924000903","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
In two-strategy coordination games with distinct payoff- and risk-dominant equilibria, existing results show that the inefficient risk-dominant equilibrium is uniquely selected under many evolutionary dynamics. In the above class of coordination games, we study the effect of introducing a bilingual strategy that is compatible with both of the existing strategies. An agent playing the bilingual strategy incurs an additional adoption cost but never miscoordinates with any other agent. We show that if the adoption cost of the bilingual strategy is low, then the efficient payoff-dominant equilibrium can be uniquely selected under many evolutionary dynamics.
期刊介绍:
The journal provides an outlet for publication of research concerning all theoretical and empirical aspects of economic dynamics and control as well as the development and use of computational methods in economics and finance. Contributions regarding computational methods may include, but are not restricted to, artificial intelligence, databases, decision support systems, genetic algorithms, modelling languages, neural networks, numerical algorithms for optimization, control and equilibria, parallel computing and qualitative reasoning.