Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control最新文献

英文中文

At home versus in a nursing home: Long-term care settings and marginal utility 在家与在养老院：长期护理环境和边际效用

IF 2.3 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control

Pub Date : 2026-01-06 DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2025.105254

Bertrand Achou , Philippe De Donder , Franca Glenzer , Minjoon Lee , Marie-Louise Leroux

Marginal utility of spending when needing long-term care, and the related incentives for precautionary savings and insurance, may vary significantly by whether one receives care at home or in a nursing home. In this paper, we develop strategic survey questions to estimate those differences. All else equal, we find that the marginal utility of spending (net of the minimum cost of care) is significantly higher when receiving care at home rather than in a nursing home. Using an illustrative calibrated life-cycle model with these LTC-setting-specific preferences, we obtain that the higher marginal utility of spending under home care generates stronger precautionary savings incentives and a higher valuation of home care subsidies relative to nursing homes. Overall, our results suggest that shifts (e.g., due to Covid) leading to a stronger preference for home care could significantly increase savings as well as the benefits of allocating resources to long-term care.

需要长期护理时支出的边际效用，以及预防性储蓄和保险的相关激励，可能会因一个人是在家接受护理还是在养老院接受护理而显著不同。在本文中，我们开发了战略性调查问题来估计这些差异。在其他条件相同的情况下，我们发现，在家中接受护理比在养老院接受护理时，支出的边际效用（扣除最低护理成本）明显更高。使用具有这些ltc设置特定偏好的说明性校准生命周期模型，我们得出，相对于养老院，家庭护理支出的较高边际效用产生更强的预防性储蓄激励和更高的家庭护理补贴估值。总体而言，我们的研究结果表明，导致人们更倾向于家庭护理的转变（例如，由于Covid）可以显著增加储蓄，并将资源分配给长期护理。

引用次数: 0

Equilibrium determinacy with behavioral expectations 均衡确定性与行为预期

IF 2.3 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control

Pub Date : 2026-01-05 DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2026.105255

Jonathan J․ Adams

Behavioral expectations affect determinacy in macroeconomic models. Relaxing rational expectations can make models more or less well behaved, depending on the behavioral assumptions. In some cases, multiplicity is created; in other cases, multiplicity is eliminated. Is it possible to tell exactly when there are multiple solutions? Yes: I derive a Behavioral Blanchard-Kahn sufficient condition that ensures a unique equilibrium exists. An equilibrium must be unique if the BBK condition holds, or if a Sunspot Admissibility (SSA) condition fails. When SSA holds and the BBK condition fails, multiplicity occurs. These conditions depend on the spectrum of the behavioral expectation operator. I describe how to check these conditions for an arbitrary behavioral expectation, and illustrate with a large variety of popular types of expectations, heuristics, and information frictions. As an example, I demonstrate that a large class of behavioral expectations imply a unique solution to the New Keynesian model with an interest rate peg, including all strictly backwards-looking heuristics. Another class of expectations imply that asset prices exhibit non-fundamental volatility in a standard model.

行为预期影响宏观经济模型的确定性。放松理性预期可以使模型或多或少表现良好，这取决于行为假设。在某些情况下，创造了多样性；在其他情况下，消除了多重性。有可能准确地分辨出什么时候有多个解吗？是的：我导出了一个行为布兰查德-卡恩充分条件，它保证了唯一均衡的存在。如果BBK条件成立，或者如果太阳黑子可容许性（SSA）条件失效，平衡必须是唯一的。当SSA保持而BBK条件失败时，就会出现多重性。这些条件取决于行为期望算子的范围。我描述了如何检查任意行为期望的这些条件，并举例说明了各种流行的期望、启发式和信息摩擦类型。作为一个例子，我证明了一大类行为预期意味着一个独特的解决方案，新凯恩斯主义模型与利率挂钩，包括所有严格向后看的启发式。另一类预期意味着，在标准模型中，资产价格表现出非基本面波动。

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引用次数: 0

Tradeoffs for the poor, divine coincidence for the rich 穷人得失，富人得失

IF 2.3 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control

Pub Date : 2026-01-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2025.105221

Marco Del Negro , Ibrahima Diagne , Keshav Dogra , Pranay Gundam , Donggyu Lee , Brian Pacula

We use an estimated medium-scale HANK model to investigate how the tradeoff between stabilizing inflation and consumption volatility varies for households with different levels of wealth. Consumption for the rich is mostly affected by demand shocks via their exposure to highly procyclical profits—for them, stabilizing consumption and inflation coincide. The poor are more vulnerable to supply shocks, hence aggressively stabilizing inflation is costly in terms of their consumption volatility. While they dislike inflation because it erodes real wages, they are hurt even more by an aggressive monetary policy response to inflation, which reduces real wages further while increasing unemployment.

我们使用估计的中等规模HANK模型来研究不同财富水平的家庭在稳定通胀和消费波动之间的权衡是如何变化的。富人的消费主要受到需求冲击的影响，因为他们面临着高度顺周期的利润——对他们来说，稳定的消费和通货膨胀是一致的。穷人更容易受到供应冲击的影响，因此，就他们的消费波动而言，积极稳定通胀是代价高昂的。虽然他们不喜欢通胀，因为它侵蚀了实际工资，但对通胀采取激进的货币政策对他们的伤害更大，因为这进一步降低了实际工资，同时增加了失业率。

引用次数: 0

Back in time. fast. Accelerated time iterations 回到过去。快。加速时间迭代

IF 2.3 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control

Pub Date : 2026-01-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2025.105226

Pablo Winant

We present two complementary algorithms to solve nonlinear rational expectations models characterized by first order conditions: an accelerated time-iteration method and a Newton–Krylov solver. Both approaches exploit an explicit construction of the derivative operator (and the model Jacobian) and achieve quadratic convergence near the solution, yielding large computational gains over standard time iteration. We show how to apply these linear operators without forming dense matrices and invert the resulting systems efficiently using truncated Neumann series or GMRES. On three benchmark models (consumption–savings, RBC, and a two-country model), the two methods produce the same solution with substantially reduced runtimes.

我们提出了两种互补的算法来求解一阶条件下的非线性理性期望模型：一种加速时间迭代法和一种Newton-Krylov求解法。这两种方法都利用了导数算子（和模型雅可比矩阵）的显式构造，并在解附近实现了二次收敛，在标准时间迭代中产生了大量的计算增益。我们展示了如何在不形成密集矩阵的情况下应用这些线性算子，并使用截断的诺伊曼级数或GMRES有效地反演得到的系统。在三个基准模型（消耗-节约、RBC和一个两国模型）上，这两种方法产生了相同的解决方案，并且大大缩短了运行时间。

引用次数: 0

Unemployment risk, liquidity traps, and monetary policy 失业风险、流动性陷阱和货币政策

IF 2.3 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control

Pub Date : 2026-01-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2025.105238

Dario Bonciani , Joonseok Oh

We study optimal monetary policy in a model with incomplete markets, in the form of uninsurable unemployment risk, and an occasionally binding zero lower bound (ZLB) constraint. The optimal policy consists of keeping the nominal rate at zero longer than implied by current macroeconomic conditions. Such policy improves expected labour market conditions, substantially mitigating the rise in unemployment risk and precautionary savings. As a result, we find that market incompleteness does not significantly amplify contractions in output and inflation at the ZLB. However, when the central bank follows more realistic policy rules instead of the optimal policy, incomplete markets exacerbate the fall in demand, emphasising the importance of unemployment insurance for output stabilisation.

本文研究了不完全市场模型下的最优货币政策，该模型具有不可保险的失业风险和偶尔约束的零下限约束。最优政策是将名义利率维持在零的时间比当前宏观经济状况所暗示的更长。这种政策改善了预期的劳动力市场状况，大大减轻了失业风险的上升和预防性储蓄。因此，我们发现市场不完全性并没有显著放大ZLB的产出收缩和通货膨胀。然而，当央行遵循更现实的政策规则，而不是最优政策时，不完整的市场加剧了需求的下降，突显了失业保险对稳定产出的重要性。

引用次数: 0

Stabilizing credit when nonperforming loans surge: The role of asset management companies 不良贷款激增时稳定信贷：资产管理公司的作用

IF 2.3 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control

Pub Date : 2025-12-31 DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2025.105249

Reiner Martin , Edward O’Brien , M. Udara Peiris , Dimitrios P. Tsomocos

When default losses elevate borrowing costs, expanding credit cannot stabilize the economy because default rates feed back to lending rates through bank balance sheets. Asset management companies (AMCs) break this loop by purchasing nonperforming loans at their long-run recovery values, thereby fixing the effective default rate that banks face. Government purchases of performing loans expand credit but leave this feedback intact. In a model calibrated to the eurozone, the AMC reduces quarterly default rates by 0.8 percentage points, lowers lending rates by 1.6 percentage points, and raises welfare by 0.2%. Government purchases crowd out bank deposits, contracting credit; default rates rise by 1.8 percentage points, lending rates increase by 1.2 percentage points, and welfare falls by 0.3%.

当违约损失提高借贷成本时，扩大信贷无法稳定经济，因为违约率会通过银行资产负债表反馈给贷款利率。资产管理公司（amc）通过以其长期回收价值购买不良贷款来打破这个循环，从而固定了银行面临的有效违约率。政府购买不良贷款扩大了信贷规模，但没有影响这种反馈。在一个针对欧元区进行校准的模型中，AMC将季度违约率降低了0.8个百分点，将贷款利率降低了1.6个百分点，并将福利水平提高了0.2%。政府购买挤占了银行存款，收缩了信贷；违约率上升1.8个百分点，贷款利率上升1.2个百分点，福利下降0.3%。

引用次数: 0

A hybrid differential game in renewable resources with sliding modes and crossing limit cycles 具有滑动模态和跨越极限环的可再生资源混合微分对策

IF 2.3 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control

Pub Date : 2025-12-31 DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2025.105248

Anton Bondarev , Thorsten Upmann

This paper investigates how ecological thresholds affect strategic exploitation in renewable resource games. We extend the standard single-agent optimal control harvesting model to a non-cooperative differential game with two agents, where the resource follows piecewise-smooth (PWS) dynamics and growth rates change abruptly at a stock threshold. The resulting three-dimensional (3D) state–costate system generates new strategic behaviour absent in smooth models. We identify sliding regions and hybrid crossing limit cycles (HCLCs) as potential open-loop Nash equilibria (OLNE), depending on parameter values. These outcomes correspond to distinct economic regimes: sliding equilibria capture threshold exploitation at fragile steady states, while HCLCs reflect endogenous boom–bust harvesting cycles. In contrast to two-dimensional (2D) optimal-control models where HCLCs cannot be optimal, our results show that strategic interaction in multi-agent settings can endogenously sustain such cycles. The analysis reveals how ecological discontinuities and strategic competition jointly shape resource dynamics, offering new insights into the stability and management of renewable resources.

本文研究了再生资源博弈中生态阈值对战略开发的影响。我们将标准的单智能体最优控制收获模型扩展到具有两个智能体的非合作微分博弈，其中资源遵循分段平滑（PWS）动态，并且增长率在库存阈值处突然变化。由此产生的三维（3D）状态-状态系统产生了光滑模型中所没有的新策略行为。我们将滑动区域和混合交叉极限环（hclc）识别为潜在的开环纳什均衡（OLNE），这取决于参数值。这些结果对应于不同的经济制度：滑动平衡捕获脆弱稳定状态下的阈值开采，而hclc反映内生的繁荣-萧条收获周期。与二维（2D）最优控制模型（hclc不能达到最优）相比，我们的研究结果表明，多智能体设置中的策略交互可以内生地维持这种循环。该分析揭示了生态不连续性和战略竞争如何共同塑造资源动态，为可再生资源的稳定性和管理提供了新的见解。

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引用次数: 0

The social value of strategic public information 战略性公共信息的社会价值

IF 2.3 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control

Pub Date : 2025-12-30 DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2025.105250

Xuesong Huang, Jianhao Lin, Yifan Zhang

We study the welfare effects of strategically using public information when the provider’s information quality is unobservable. Our model features a benevolent public authority that privately observes her information quality and strategically chooses whether to provide public information to private-sector agents in a beauty-contest game à la Morris and Shin (2002). We show that the authority’s equilibrium strategy hinges on her expected information advantage relative to private-sector agents. When the advantage is either small or large, the authority pools across qualities, and with risk-averse agents, the added uncertainty regarding quality lowers welfare relative to a benchmark without such uncertainty. When the information advantage is intermediate, a separating equilibrium emerges: the high-quality authority provides public information, while the low-quality authority withholds it. In this case, the strategic use of public information enhances welfare by channeling superior information into decisions while limiting overreaction to weak information. By delineating these regimes, we clarify when the social value of strategic public information is beneficial versus detrimental, offering guidance for public communication policies.

我们研究了当提供者的信息质量不可观察时，策略性地使用公共信息的福利效应。我们的模型以一个仁慈的公共权威为特征，它私下观察自己的信息质量，并在选美比赛中战略性地选择是否向私营部门代理人提供公共信息（la Morris and Shin, 2002）。我们表明，权威的均衡策略取决于她相对于私营部门代理人的预期信息优势。当优势或大或小时，权力集中在不同的品质上，而对于风险厌恶的代理人，与没有这种不确定性的基准相比，质量方面增加的不确定性降低了福利。当信息优势处于中间状态时，出现了一种分离均衡：高质量权威提供公开信息，低质量权威隐瞒公开信息。在这种情况下，战略性地使用公共信息，通过将优质信息引导到决策中，同时限制对弱信息的过度反应，从而提高福利。通过描述这些机制，我们明确了战略性公共信息的社会价值何时是有益的，何时是有害的，从而为公共传播政策提供指导。

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引用次数: 0

Dancing to the wrong tune: How rational myopia, belief heterogeneity, and adjustment costs shape financial bubbles 跳错调子：理性短视、信仰异质性和调整成本如何塑造金融泡沫

IF 2.3 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control

Pub Date : 2025-12-30 DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2025.105251

Elyès Jouini

We introduce the Anticipations-Based Production Equilibrium (ABPE) as a minimal extension of the Arrow–Radner Production Equilibrium (ARPE). Whereas ARPE requires optimality and rational expectations, ABPE relies only on local optimization and locally coherent expectations. This mild departure preserves internal consistency, coincides with ARPE in discrete time, while in continuous time allows for speculative bubbles, defined intrinsically as price trajectories that rise explosively before collapsing in finite time. To illustrate the concept, we develop a continuous-time production economy with heterogeneous beliefs and convex adjustment costs, where bubbles emerge endogenously from the interplay of nonlinear price dynamics, and belief-driven momentum. We characterize the precise conditions under which bubbles emerge, and distinguish between financial bubbles, which affect only asset prices, and real bubbles, which also impact production and growth. The ABPE framework is general and accommodates a variety of belief formation mechanisms, which we illustrate with anticipations constructed through backward inference and regret minimization.

我们引入了基于预期的生产均衡（ABPE），作为Arrow-Radner生产均衡（ARPE）的最小扩展。ARPE要求最优性和理性预期，而ABPE只依赖于局部优化和局部一致预期。这种温和的偏离保持了内部一致性，在离散时间内与ARPE一致，而在连续时间内允许投机泡沫，本质上定义为价格轨迹在有限时间内爆炸上升，然后崩溃。为了说明这一概念，我们开发了一个具有异质信念和凸调整成本的连续时间生产经济，其中泡沫从非线性价格动态和信念驱动的动量的相互作用中内生地出现。我们描述了泡沫产生的精确条件，并区分了只影响资产价格的金融泡沫和同样影响生产和增长的真正泡沫。ABPE框架具有通用性，可容纳多种信念形成机制，我们通过反向推理和遗憾最小化构建期望来说明这些机制。

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引用次数: 0

Bank lending standards and the U.S. economy 银行贷款标准和美国经济

IF 2.3 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control

Pub Date : 2025-12-30 DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2025.105247

Elijah Broadbent , Huberto M. Ennis , Tyler J. Pike , Horacio Sapriza

The provision of bank credit to firms and households affects macroeconomic performance. We use survey measures of changes in bank lending standards, disaggregated by loan category, to quantify the effect of changes in banks’ attitudes toward lending on aggregate output, inflation, and interest rates. Bank lending to businesses is particularly important for macroeconomic outcomes, with peak effects on output growth of around 30 to 40 basis points after four quarters of the initial shock. These effects depend on the stage of the business cycle and the proximity of the short-term interest rate to its effective lower bound. The effects are larger when output is growing below trend, when uncertainty is increasing or high, and when interest rates are away from the lower bound. We also find that the response of the economy to lending-standards shocks is asymmetric, with tightening shocks having larger effects on output.

向企业和家庭提供银行信贷影响宏观经济表现。我们使用银行贷款标准变化的调查措施，按贷款类别分类，量化银行对贷款态度的变化对总产出、通货膨胀和利率的影响。银行对企业的贷款对宏观经济结果尤其重要，在最初四个季度的冲击过后，对产出增长的峰值影响约为30至40个基点。这些影响取决于商业周期的阶段和短期利率接近其有效下限的程度。当产出增长低于趋势水平，当不确定性增加或很高，以及当利率远离下限时，这种影响更大。我们还发现，经济对贷款标准冲击的反应是不对称的，紧缩冲击对产出的影响更大。

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全部化学•材料生命科学医学物理工程技术环境•农林材料科学地球科学法学管理学化学环境科学与生态学计算机科学教育学经济学农林科学人文科学生物学数学物理与天体物理心理学综合性期刊其他工业工程理学历史学农学文学信息工程

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Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control

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