组内竞争激励

IF 5.1 1区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS Journal of Development Economics Pub Date : 2024-06-07 DOI:10.1016/j.jdeveco.2024.103320
Michael Olabisi , Mywish Maredia , Jiawen Liu , Toyin Ajibade , Hakeem Ajeigbe
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引用次数: 0

摘要

如何激励外勤人员按时完成活动目标?与简单地为工人设定目标相比,在小组内引入竞争能否激励工人更快地完成目标?我们进行了一项实验,将一个移动应用程序注册项目的临时外勤人员分为两个处理组:追求个人目标的外勤人员组和为实现共同小组目标而竞争的外勤人员组。我们对外勤人员是否达到目标、达到目标的时间以及每位外勤人员的注册用户数量进行了测量。我们的模型表明,与个人目标相比,野外作业人员更快地完成组内竞争目标的任务。与这一预测相一致,我们观察到,组内竞争导致注册用户数量增加,目标完成速度加快。虽然不同性别的效果没有明显差异,但竞争待遇对就业人员、经验较少的人员和能力较强的人员更有效。
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In-group competition for incentives

How can one motivate field staff to meet activity goals on time? Can introducing competition within groups motivate workers to meet goals faster than simply setting targets for workers? We conducted an experiment that assigned temporary field workers for a mobile app registration project into two treatment groups: field workers pursuing individual goals versus competing for a shared group-goal. We measure whether field workers reached their goal, the time to reach the goal, and the number of registered users per field worker. Our model suggests that field workers complete tasks more quickly with in-group competitive targets compared to individual targets. In line with this prediction, we observed that in-group competition led to an increased number of registrations and faster target achievement. Although the effects do not significantly vary by gender, the competition treatment proved more effective for employed individuals, those with less experience, and those with higher ability.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
8.30
自引率
4.00%
发文量
126
审稿时长
72 days
期刊介绍: The Journal of Development Economics publishes papers relating to all aspects of economic development - from immediate policy concerns to structural problems of underdevelopment. The emphasis is on quantitative or analytical work, which is relevant as well as intellectually stimulating.
期刊最新文献
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