Agriculture and food in the West Bank after October 7, 2023

The situation of agriculture in the West Bank since October 7, 2023 is a continuation of an ongoing process of destruction, confiscation, and enclosure witnessed prior to that date. The Palestinian Ministry of Agriculture (2024) estimates that the total damage to Palestinian farmers and herders from October 7 to December 31, 2023 has been US$ 22,585,410. Many of the issues farmers in the West Bank are currently facing are only slight variations on a theme of persistent violence that they have endured for decades, but the more marked shift is in the pace of change since October 7. Dozens, if not hundreds, of communities are suddenly at risk of displacement, while in some places displaced peoples are already numbering in the thousands. The agricultural forms that sustain the most livelihoods in the West Bank are oleo-culture and herding, both of which have been central targets by the Israeli army and settlers.

This most recent colonial aggression is not an aberration but rather a continuation of the settler program in Palestine. What is happening in the West Bank today cannot be compared to the scale of devastation in Gaza, but that speaks more to the horrors occurring in Gaza. The extent of settler attacks, settlement expansion, army incursions, clashes, and assassinations of youth that have occurred in the West Bank since October 7 has not been seen since the 2000–2005 Second Intifada. Meanwhile, rapid decreases in access to land, water, and income are eroding people's ability to sustain themselves and their families.

As a Mediterranean country, Palestine is composed of several micro-regions. The West Bank starts from its western end at elevations of 200 m above sea level and reaches over 1000 m in several places. East of the hills is the Jordan Valley, which drops to 276 m below sea level at the city of Jericho. The Jordan Valley is the vegetable basket of the West Bank, where the villages and Jericho have ample irrigated agriculture, while Bedouins inhabit the area between the irrigated lands and the hills in its north–south stretch. To the west and north of the hills are the coastal plains, which make up the districts of Qalqilya, Tulkarim, and Jenin, which together are the site of over 50% of national olive oil production. To the south of the hills are the fringes of the Naqab desert, represented by the city of Hebron and its many populous towns. Hebron produces most of the West Bank's grapes and grape products and is where much of the country's herding activities take place.

As part of the 1994 Oslo Peace Process, the West Bank was divided along different lines of control, with Area A being under Palestinian administrative and security control, Area B under Palestinian administrative and Israeli security control, and Area C under Israeli administrative and security control. These arrangements were meant to be only temporary until a more comprehensive peace agreement could be reached. However, permanent peace never materialized and the temporary arrangements became “the status quo.” Area A contains most of the cities in the West Bank, whereas Area C, which is roughly 60% of the West Bank, contains most of the agricultural lands and natural resources.

The olive tree has long been a central pillar of the agricultural economy in Palestine. The 2023 harvest was interrupted by the most recent onslaught. It is difficult to accurately estimate losses due to the biennial nature of olive production, yet 2023s 10,000 tons pales in comparison with 2022s 36,000 and 2021s 17,000 tons. UN-OCHA noted the loss of roughly 1200 metric tons of olive oil in the 2023 season resulting in a direct financial setback of US$ 10 million (UN-OCHA, 2024). Additionally, around 10% of olive presses did not open this year compared with the previous 2 years, due to the closure of roads and the difficulty of reaching mills.

Prior to the 1948 Nakbeh (catastrophe), Palestine was home to nearly 6 million olive trees (Al-Taher, 1947). Although the West Bank only makes up 22% of historic Palestine, today it is home to roughly 10 million fruit-bearing olive trees. Across the Palestinian territories, olive trees make up 85% of the fruit trees and take up 54% of the arable land in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Olives contribute to the livelihood of 80,000–100,000 Palestinian families and make up 4.6% of the GDP (World Bank, 2018).

The main reason behind the expansion of olive culture in the period from 1967 to present is land defense. After the 1967 occupation of the West Bank, military authorities justified the confiscation of land by claiming that it was “unused.” Olives require little care compared to field crops, and many local cultivars are drought and disease resistant, making them ideal candidates in the struggle of land defense. They ensured people's livelihoods while protecting the land made the expansion of oleo-culture in uncertain times a form of social protection. Millions were planted as part of volunteer drives by youth in the 1970s and 1980s. International aid has played a role in the expansion of olive planting as well, with the 1948–1967 period seeing expansion in terraced agriculture and oleo-culture financed by the British government as a means of income generation for newly created refugees (Reger, 2018). Since the establishment of the Palestinian Authority (PA) in 1994, several government programs have worked to expand land defense via oleo-culture, supplemented by donor intervention aimed at increasing productivity and profitability.

Given the role of the olive sector in producing food, income, and land protection, it is no wonder the Israeli army and settlers target it so systematically. UN-OCHA estimated that from 1967 to 2011, over 800,000 olive trees were uprooted, while the Palestinian Ministry of Agriculture and Central Bureau of Statistics documented more than 278,000 olive trees that were completely or partially destroyed between 2010 and 2023. Combining these numbers and accounting for the double counting of the years 2010–2011, we find the olive tree casualty rate of over a million trees since the start of the occupation in the West Bank. The 2023 yearly report from the Colonization and Wall Resistance Commission documented 379 attacks against the West Bank in 2023, with olive trees making up just under 19,000 of the 21,731 trees that were destroyed, or nearly 90%. It is safe to assume that these statistics are the tip of the iceberg.

Bedouin communities inhabit the Jordan Valley in the East, and herder communities live in the south of Hebron in the area surrounding the town of Yatta. Bedouins are historically misrepresented as communities that do not farm. However, they did and still do farm alongside their herding activities. Often enough, the farming they do is to support their herds. Both Bedouins in the Jordan Valleys and herders in the Masafir Yatta have had their homes and livelihoods threatened for some time now.

The Bedouin communities of the Jordan Valley numbered 3000 families in 2016, of which about 18 different tribes inhabit the “E1” pass which Israeli authorities continually attempt to depopulate. More than 40% of Bedouin communities are denied electricity infrastructure, while in terms of water access, Bedouins have access to 20 L of water per day, compared to the 300 L/day the nearby settlers have access to (UNDP, 2017). The destruction wrought by the army and settlers during the 2016–2017 period led to 84% of the Bedouin and Palestinian herders in the West Bank requiring assistance, with roughly 55% being food insecure. Settler violence is a major issue in these areas. Prior to October 7, an average of three settler attacks per day occurred in the West Bank. Since October 7, the number has risen to an average of seven attacks per day (UN-OCHA, 2023).

The formation of right-wing coalitions in the Israeli government escalated the difficult situation of communities even further after 2018. Since then, the phrase “pastoral colonization” (al-istitan al-ra'awi [الاستيطان الرعو]) has entered the Arabic lexicon. In the Jordan Valley, the work of these “settler cowboys” has centered around enclosing water sources. The enclosure of water sources is worthy of special attention. In the last 25–30 years many springs dried up due to climate change and landscape changes created by settlements and the ABC zoning. In the last 5 years, 70%–80% of springs were enclosed and fell under complete Israeli control. The remainder of the springs are also under Israeli control but allow partial entry at certain times to herders. In the Jordan Valley, at least 16 Bedouin communities have been completely displaced since October 7th, with water scarcity being a central reason.

Where enclosure to pastures might be offset with government or NGO assistance and/or the temporary purchase of fodder, the amount and scale of water needs make it much more costly and an intervention that is needed more often. The targeting of water tankers and silos only exacerbates the problem. Heat in the Jordan Valley is arid, with summer temperatures averaging 36°C and climate change-induced heat waves reaching temperatures as high as 46°C in 2023. With the coming summer heat, those who cannot secure water for their herds will be forced to sell or move. Many communities have already had to make this choice, but the scale of herd sales has yet to be seen due to difficulty of reporting, a point discussed in more detail below.

Since October 7, settler cowboys have moved on to directly targeting and destroying agricultural machinery, irrigation pipes, and water tanks, as well as injuring, confiscating, or releasing the herds of community members in the area, and they often threaten and even shoot community members. It seems that where once the settlers assisted the army when carrying out these tasks, since October 7, the settlers dressed in their reserve fatigues and carried out these attacks directly.

Cowboy-militia attacks are reported more often in the Masafir Yatta, where private Palestinian lands are being openly confiscated and enclosed. Herding by Palestinians has been restricted to a 100-m radius from community centers, all while water infrastructure and water tankers continue to be damaged and destroyed. Settler shepherds are pasturing their livestock on lands planted with wheat and barley by Palestinian farmers. Settlers are putting up tents and caravans on hilltops in the Masafir and connecting these caravans with roads, which disconnect and isolate small Palestinian communities.

Those familiar with the work of Alfred Crosby (2004) on ecological imperialism will not be shocked to discover similar settler tactics in landscape shaping of the West Bank. Where settler cowboys graze caprine along the semi-desert fringes of the Masafir, in the rest of the West Bank it is predominantly cattle. These literal settler cowboys graze their cattle while armed with Ozi's and AR15's instead of the Henry Repeating Rifle or the Winchester often seen in old westerns. The cattle are allowed to treat Palestinian grain fields, olive groves, and terraced lands as open grazing areas, destroying trees and crops as they go. Unlike sheep and goat herds, herding large cattle in this landscape quickly leads to overgrazing and results in loss of surface cover, enabling erosion, which is exacerbating desertification throughout the West Bank.

In addition to the effects of overgrazing, cattle are notorious for trampling and damaging or destroying stone terraces. These terraces have been referred to as the pyramids of Palestine due to the amount of labor that went into erecting them throughout the hill regions. Their role is central in preserving not just topsoil but moisture. In the region's semi-arid climate, up to 60% of rainwater is lost to evaporation. Terraces force water underground and trap essential moisture. Studies on the impact of terraces on olive culture have shown that trees with erected terraces protecting them produce 10%–15% more oil. Decreasing soil moisture, increasing temperatures, and enclosures preventing goats from grazing combine to create the ticking timebombs of wildfires. The water retention enabled by terraces recharges groundwater aquifers and/or creates springs, depending on the geography of the area. The long-term impact of cattle could be to decrease access to water for everyone who relies on it.¹

Where settler cowboys and their cattle are the main force of ecological invasion, wild boars are the shock troops. Virtually nonexistent in the mountains of the West Bank prior to the 1980s, wild boar has populated the hills and increased their numbers as a result of Israeli Civil Affairs (ICA) conservation policies that have made it illegal for Palestinians to shoot them. While human rights organizations have yet to document it, dozens of citizen reports across the last two decades claim settlers intentionally release wild boar into Palestinians agricultural areas. The largest casualty of boar advances is triticulture or wheat production in the West Bank hills, which has almost completely disappeared where they roam (see Amira, 2021). Over the last few decades, boars have been able to benefit from interrelated processes: ICA-designated conservation parks where these boars populate; pine trees planted by the Jewish National Fund, which are ideal congregation points for wild boars; and ICA culling bans and settler attacks on agricultural communities. In the summer heat, boars driven by thirst enter population areas and target water tanks and irrigation drips, and they have been known to dig under fencing or bring down rock walls to get to a water source. They continue to damage green houses, gardens, fields, and groves and have injured and killed people who fall along their path.

As noted above, Area C makes up 60% of the West Bank and contains most of its agricultural land and natural resources. It is subject to Israeli security and administrative control, yet services and essential infrastructure are financed largely by either intergovernmental organizations, donor states, or the PA and are implemented by NGOs and local government units. The ability of civil organizations to function has decreased exponentially in the last decade (and most acutely since 2018). A central reason for this is impediments created by settler organizations.

Ragavim and NGO Monitor are two settler organizations that have worked to speed the pace of colonial eliminatory rhythms (Ghantous & Joronen, 2022). NGO Monitor started harassing donors of organizations operating in Area C in 2018 with a campaign to cut the funding of Maan Development Center, which was temporarily successful. Ragavim meanwhile targeted the Union of Agricultural Work Committees (UAWC) from as early as 2014, and in 2018 affirmed targeting “the main organisation involved in agricultural projects in Area C” (White, 2020). That this targeting reached five other rights organizations whose work focused on challenging the settler state should come as no surprise. Unfortunately, this second wave was more successful and several of these organizations have not been able to regain their prior strength (and funding). Among much other work, Maan and UAWC operate mainly in Area C. Maan is one of Palestine's oldest environmental organizations and has worked tirelessly for decades to ban carcinogenic pesticides. The UAWC is the only organization that preserves indigenous seeds (i.e., Baladi seeds) in its seed bank.

The attacks on these essential organizations were a rehearsal for what has happened since October 7. Claims of ties to terrorism get lobbed, and donors withdraw their funds when interventions are most needed. The European Union's rash recent decision to freeze aid funding to the West Bank demonstrates the chilling success of these tactics. Yet the evidence provided is all the more worrying, especially considering how willing most European donor states are to give legibility to Israeli claims when torture of prisoners and extraction of false confessions by the Israeli government is well documented (Addameer, n.d.; OHCHR, 2021).

The freezing of UNRWA funding when mass starvation is at Gaza's doors is arguably as criminal as the siege itself. Yet there seems to have been a sleight of hand in the funding landscape as well. Many projects canceled during the funding freeze were not reinstated but rather the money was diverted to humanitarian response, leaving vulnerable communities in Area C at the mercy of settler cowboys. UN-OCHA, the Colonization and Wall Resistance Committee (CWRC), and B'tselem seem to be actively documenting the situation. Yet they are not structured any different from UNRWA, the PA, and Palestinian NGOs, and hence are prone to being targeted by settler organizations—and indeed often are.

The throttling of work and income has also been leveraged against Palestinians. West Bank Palestinian laborers who work inside the Green Line had their permits suspended after October 7, leading to a jump from 14% to 30% unemployment. This increase is due to 150,000–180,000 Palestinians working in settlements and Israeli cities, roughly 75% of whom have not been permitted to return to work since (Bajec, 2024). Since October 7, the Israeli government has started deducting tax revenue collected on behalf of the Palestinian Authority, and public sector employees are receiving as low as 50% of their wages some months. Public sector employees number roughly 165,000–185,000 people, with the West Bank constituting roughly 140,000 of them. In addition to the above, the increase in checkpoints is increasing the cost of transport within the West Bank, raising food costs. Finally, tourism constitutes an important source of income in some cities, especially Bethlehem, Jerusalem, and Jericho, an industry that has all but ceased to operate since October 7.

The largest employers in the West Bank are the PA, employment in Israeli construction and agriculture sectors, and civil society organizations. That all three sources are subject to cuts shows the high level of dependency created by the Oslo Accords and the real-life impact of collective punishment. In short, the squeeze put on Palestinian society in the West Bank since October 7 has aimed at punishing the middle and working classes, targeting their access to food and water, their livelihoods, and their ways of life. How much longer the pressure can hold without an ensuing explosion is not clear. What is clear is that a lot of people have less income at a time when the price of food is rising and that the dynamics of culture, politics, labor, food, and the environment are inextricably linked.

To conclude, it is important to note the discourse of blame and responsibility that is starting to circulate. This pertains particularly to the scapegoating of Netanyahu's premiership and right-wing governing coalitions. While certainly there are some unique characteristics to the current government, the fundamental fact is that the settler colonization of Palestine has continued regardless of who sits on what chair in the Knesset. The intention to replace the native population has been in the planning from the start. Now more than ever, Patrick Wolfe's maxim that “invasion is a structure not an event” holds true.