二次思考:测试自发未来思维的内在机制。

IF 2.8 1区 心理学 Q1 PSYCHOLOGY, EXPERIMENTAL Cognition Pub Date : 2024-06-25 DOI:10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105863
J. Helgi Clayton McClure, Charlotte Elwell, Theo Jones, Jelena Mirković, Scott N. Cole
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引用次数: 0

摘要

人类能够以最小的认知努力,无意中想象未来可能发生的事件,这种能力被称为自发未来思维(SFT)。本文探讨了认知科学的一个重要理论问题:这种自发未来思维体验背后可能存在哪些认知机制?我们对比了文献中的三种假说:在线构建假说、重铸假说和未来想法记忆假说。研究 1(N = 41)使用了新颖的主观评分,对重铸机制提出了质疑:大部分 SFTs 被评为与自传体记忆不相似,这表明它们并不是简单地将过去的经历 "重铸 "为未来事件。研究 2(N = 90)采用了一种新颖的实验范式,比较了自愿的偶发未来建构和非个人叙述对后续自发思维取样的影响。结果表明,自发的未来结构仍然可以被自发检索到,这支持了未来想法记忆的假设。这一发现以及这两项研究中的其他数据仍然表明在线建构过程在自发思维取样中的作用,但还需要进一步的实证工作来澄清建构过程在自发思维取样中是如何以及何时参与的。综合来看,这两项研究代表了人们为阐明 SFT 的内在机制所做的初步努力,首次证明了刻意设想的未来事件可以在无意中于稍后的某个时间重新出现在意识中,并进一步支持了未来思维的双重过程论。这些方法和发现为后续关于未来思维的实验和纵向研究奠定了坚实的基础。
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On second thoughts: Testing the underlying mechanisms of spontaneous future thought

The human capacity to imagine possible future events unintentionally, with minimal cognitive effort, is termed spontaneous future thought (SFT). This paper addresses an important theoretical question for cognitive science: What are the possible cognitive mechanisms underlying such SFT experiences? We contrasted three hypotheses present in the literature: the online construction hypothesis, the recasting hypothesis, and the memories of future thoughts hypothesis. Study 1 (N = 41) used novel subjective ratings which challenged the recasting mechanism: SFTs were mostly rated as dissimilar to autobiographical memories, suggesting they are not simply past experiences ‘recast’ as future events. Study 2 (N = 90) used a novel experimental paradigm, comparing effects of voluntary episodic future constructions and non-personal narratives upon subsequent spontaneous thought sampling. Results suggested that voluntary future constructions remain accessible to spontaneous retrieval, supporting the memories of future thoughts hypothesis. This finding, and other data presented across the two studies, still indicates a role for online construction processes in SFT, but further empirical work is needed to clarify how and when constructive processes are engaged in SFT. Taken together, these two studies represent initial efforts to elucidate the mechanisms underlying SFT, providing the first proof-of-principle that deliberately envisioned future events can reappear, without intention, in consciousness at some later time, and further supporting the dual process account of future thinking. These methods and findings provide a firm basis for subsequent experimental and longitudinal research on SFT.

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来源期刊
Cognition
Cognition PSYCHOLOGY, EXPERIMENTAL-
CiteScore
6.40
自引率
5.90%
发文量
283
期刊介绍: Cognition is an international journal that publishes theoretical and experimental papers on the study of the mind. It covers a wide variety of subjects concerning all the different aspects of cognition, ranging from biological and experimental studies to formal analysis. Contributions from the fields of psychology, neuroscience, linguistics, computer science, mathematics, ethology and philosophy are welcome in this journal provided that they have some bearing on the functioning of the mind. In addition, the journal serves as a forum for discussion of social and political aspects of cognitive science.
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