输电网络的商人投资

IF 3.8 3区经济学 Q3 ENERGY & FUELS Utilities Policy Pub Date : 2024-06-25 DOI:10.1016/j.jup.2024.101796

Darryl R. Biggar , Mohammad Reza Hesamzadeh

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引用次数: 0

摘要

许多电力经济学家长期以来一直希望能够建立竞争机制，不仅在提供发电和负载资产方面，而且在提供输电网络本身方面。20 世纪 90 年代，人们曾尝试利用传统的金融输电权（FTR）实现所谓的商业输电投资，但结果令人失望。我们对筛选曲线模型进行了扩展，以包括发电和输电的最优选择。这种模型虽然是风格化的，但对发电和输电的长期共同优化提供了有价值的见解。我们提出了新的监管和商业输电投资机制，以实现社会最优投资。

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Merchant investment in electricity transmission networks

Many electricity economists have long hoped that it might be possible to establish competition, not just in providing generation and load assets, but also in the provision of the transmission network itself. Attempts in the 1990s to achieve so-called merchant transmission investment using conventional Financial Transmission Rights (FTRs) proved disappointing. We develop an extension of screening-curve models to include the optimal choice of both generation and transmission. Such models, although stylised, provide valuable insight into the long-run co-optimisation of generation and transmission. We propose new regulatory and merchant transmission investment mechanisms that achieve the socially optimal investment.

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来源期刊

Utilities Policy ENERGY & FUELS-ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES

CiteScore

6.80

自引率

10.00%

发文量

审稿时长

66 days

期刊介绍： Utilities Policy is deliberately international, interdisciplinary, and intersectoral. Articles address utility trends and issues in both developed and developing economies. Authors and reviewers come from various disciplines, including economics, political science, sociology, law, finance, accounting, management, and engineering. Areas of focus include the utility and network industries providing essential electricity, natural gas, water and wastewater, solid waste, communications, broadband, postal, and public transportation services. Utilities Policy invites submissions that apply various quantitative and qualitative methods. Contributions are welcome from both established and emerging scholars as well as accomplished practitioners. Interdisciplinary, comparative, and applied works are encouraged. Submissions to the journal should have a clear focus on governance, performance, and/or analysis of public utilities with an aim toward informing the policymaking process and providing recommendations as appropriate. Relevant topics and issues include but are not limited to industry structures and ownership, market design and dynamics, economic development, resource planning, system modeling, accounting and finance, infrastructure investment, supply and demand efficiency, strategic management and productivity, network operations and integration, supply chains, adaptation and flexibility, service-quality standards, benchmarking and metrics, benefit-cost analysis, behavior and incentives, pricing and demand response, economic and environmental regulation, regulatory performance and impact, restructuring and deregulation, and policy institutions.