贷款人的环境监督:私人贷款合同中的环境契约证据

Ruby Lee, Mark Zakota
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摘要

我们调查了私人贷款合同中对借款人的环境行为提出要求或限制的契约(以下简称 "环境契约")的作用。利用机器学习算法,我们发现环境契约非常普遍,出现在样本中 54% 的贷款合同中。这些契约的使用与借款人的环境风险暴露、借款人与贷款人之间的信息不对称以及抵押品和贷款期限等关键合同条款有显著关联。当借款人面临更大的财务困境、贷款人的声誉更高和监管执法的风险更高时,环境风险与环境契约之间的关联就更加明显。其他分析表明,董事会中存在一个负责监督环境问题的委员会,会降低贷款人通过合同解决借款人环境风险的要求。总之,我们的研究结果为解决环境风险的合同机制和影响贷款人环境监督需求的因素提供了新的见解。
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Lenders’ Environmental Monitoring: Evidence From Environmental Covenants in Private Loan Contracts
We investigate the role of covenants in private loan contracts that place requirements or limitations on borrowers’ environmental actions (hereafter, “environmental covenants”). Utilizing a machine learning algorithm, we find that environmental covenants are highly prevalent, appearing in 54% of loan contracts in our sample. The use of these covenants is significantly associated with borrowers’ environmental risk exposure, borrower–lender information asymmetry, and key contract terms, such as collateral and loan maturity. The association between environmental risk and environmental covenants is more pronounced when borrowers face greater financial distress, lenders have a stronger reputation, and there is a higher risk of regulatory enforcement. Additional analysis shows that the presence of a board committee overseeing environmental matters reduces lenders’ demand to contractually address the borrower’s environmental risk. Collectively, our results provide novel insights into the contractual mechanisms addressing environmental risk and the factors shaping lenders’ environmental monitoring demand.
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