阿莫多尔完成:心理想象还是 3D 建模?

IF 1.8 Q2 PSYCHOLOGY, MULTIDISCIPLINARY Review of Philosophy and Psychology Pub Date : 2024-07-01 DOI:10.1007/s13164-024-00740-1
Christopher Gauker
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引用次数: 0

摘要

在 "模态完成"(amodal completion)中,思维在某种意义上通过表现隐藏在其他物体后面的场景部分来完成场景的视觉感知表征。认知科学对模态完成是如何发生的有很多论述,但对所涉及的表征形式及其表征方式却知之甚少。一些哲学家认为,模态完成的形式是对被遮蔽部分的感官想象。这种理论给哲学和神经科学都带来了一个难题,即如何想象被遮蔽部分相对于未被遮蔽部分的位置。更好的理论首先要观察到,在许多情况下,假设大脑包含三维结构的心理模型是有用的。视觉感知和心理图像可以被看作是心理模型,它们通过同构性来表现外部场景,并同时具有深度和视角两个方面,前者代表可见和隐蔽的三维结构,后者只代表可见表面的排列。我们可以用这些术语来解释各种解决问题的能力,例如想象场景从另一个角度看会是什么样子的能力。模态补全可被视为三维结构的深层感知表征。因此,模态补全并不包含心理想象,但它们可以用来产生心理想象,代表一个场景从其他角度看会是什么样子。
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Amodal Completion: Mental Imagery or 3D Modeling?

In amodal completion the mind in some sense completes the visual perceptual representation of a scene by representing parts of the scene hidden behind other objects. Cognitive science has had a lot to say about how amodal completion occurs but has had little to say about the format of the representations involved and the way in which they represent. Some philosophers hold that amodal completions take the form of sensory imaginings of the occluded portions. This theory poses a puzzle for both philosophy and neuroscience about how the occluded parts are imagined to be located relative to the unoccluded parts. A better theory begins with the observation that for many purposes it is useful to suppose that the mind contains mental models of three-dimensional structure. Visual perceptions and mental images may be conceived as mental models that represent external scenes by virtue of homomorphism and which possess both a deep aspect, representing both visible and occluded three-dimensional structure, and a perspectival aspect, representing only an arrangement of visible surfaces. In these terms we can explain various problem-solving abilities, such as the ability to imagine what a scene will look like from another point of view. Amodal completions can be treated as deep perceptual representations of three-dimensional structure. Thus amodal completions do not consist of mental imagery, but they can be used to generate mental imagery representing how a scene would look from alternative points of view.

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来源期刊
Review of Philosophy and Psychology
Review of Philosophy and Psychology PSYCHOLOGY, MULTIDISCIPLINARY-
CiteScore
4.70
自引率
5.00%
发文量
60
期刊介绍: The Review of Philosophy and Psychology is a peer-reviewed journal focusing on philosophical and foundational issues in cognitive science. The aim of the journal is to provide a forum for discussion on topics of mutual interest to philosophers and psychologists and to foster interdisciplinary research at the crossroads of philosophy and the sciences of the mind, including the neural, behavioural and social sciences. The journal publishes theoretical works grounded in empirical research as well as empirical articles on issues of philosophical relevance. It includes thematic issues featuring invited contributions from leading authors together with articles answering a call for papers. The Review of Philosophy and Psychology is published quarterly and is hosted at the Jean Nicod Institute, a research centre of the French Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique. It was formerly published as the "European Review of Philosophy" by CSLI Publications, Stanford.
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