Review of Philosophy and Psychology最新文献

The mainstream philosophical approach to inference, which insists on sentence-like representations and a linguistic capability, excludes non-human animals as possible agents capable of making inferences. However, an abundance of studies show that many animal species exhibit behaviors that seem to rely on some kind of reasoning. My focus here are the transitive inference tasks, which most species solve quite successfully. These findings put pressure on the mainstream views, and still lack a convincing explanation. I introduce the concept of affective representations, which satisfy the semantic and structural requirements for participating in inferences. I also argue for a broader conception of inference, and show how we can apply this view to explain the results of the transitive inference studies. Finally, I suggest it is more useful to think of flexibility of thought in terms of a continuous range, rather than a dichotomy of flexible vs. inflexible.

Theoretical debates around the concept of self-deception revolve around identifying the conditions for a behavior to qualify as self-deception. Experiments 1 and 2 revealed that various candidate features—such as intent, belief change, and motive—are treated as sufficient, but non-necessary, conditions according to the lay concept of self-deception. This led us to ask whether there are multiple lay concepts, such that different participants endorse competing theories (the disagreement view), or whether individual participants assign partial weight to various features and consequently waver in cases of middling similarity (the conflict view). In Experiment 3, by-participant regression models uncovered that most participants additively consider multiple characteristics of the prototype of self-deception, while only a minority of participants treat a characteristic (or a combination thereof) as necessary and sufficient. In sum, by disambiguating interpersonal disagreement and intrapersonal conflict in a within-subjects design, the present experiments indicate that the lay concept may primarily exhibit a prototype structure. In closing, we suggest that future research deploying this method may help to explain why experimental research on philosophical concepts often engenders partial support for competing theories.

Between the elitist “philosophy is for grown-ups” and the demagogic “everyone can be a philosopher”, where does Philosophy for Children (P4C) belong in preschools? What is it assumed, expected, or intended to achieve? How is it implemented? This article reviews the literature evaluating the impact of P4C practices on preschool children (aged 3–6). It identifies the main actual or purported obstacles signaled by educators to argue that philosophy cannot be practiced before age 6. It then appraises, from a cognitive developmental psychology perspective, the reality of these supposed obstacles, considering the underlying developmental skills that very young children may lack compared with older ones. Finally, pedagogical adjustments to P4C school practices are suggested, illustrated, and discussed to adapt this program, initially designed and documented for elementary-school children, to the potential of preschoolers.

How do we acquire the notions of cardinality and cardinal number? In the (neo-)Fregean approach, they are derived from the notion of equinumerosity. According to some alternative approaches, defended and developed by Husserl and Parsons among others, the order of explanation is reversed: equinumerosity is explained in terms of cardinality, which, in turn, is explained in terms of our ordinary practices of counting. In their paper, ‘Cardinality, Counting, and Equinumerosity’, Richard Kimberly Heck proposes that instead of equinumerosity or counting, cardinality is derived from a cognitively earlier notion of just as many. In this paper, we assess Heck’s proposal in terms of contemporary theories of number concept acquisition. Focusing on bootstrapping theories, we argue that there is no evidence that the notion of just as many is cognitively primary. Furthermore, since the acquisition of cardinality is an enculturated process, the cognitive primariness of these notions, possibly including just as many, depends on various external cultural factors. Therefore, being possibly a cultural construction, just as many could be one among several notions used in the acquisition of cardinality and cardinal number concepts. This paper thus challenges those accounts which seek for a fundamental concept underlying all aspects of numerical cognition.

The tendency for people to remember less as members of a group than they would be capable of were they to remember alone is a phenomenon known as collaborative inhibition. The article offers a phenomenological account of this highly counterintuitive effect of group remembering. It argues that the mutual failure to live up to one’s potential does not warrant the standard, strongly negative views about the role of others in recall. Rather, the phenomenon may imply that sharedness itself becomes constitutive of the process in the sense that interaction partners co-determine what and how to remember. Drawing on phenomenological approaches to remembering and second-person engagement, the article argues that individuals participating in shared remembering co-construct their memories by reciprocally and dynamically incorporating each other’s perspectives, attitudes, and emotions about their shared past.

Anorexia Nervosa is widely recognized as having both cognitive and affective dimensions. Current accounts typically explain the perplexing behaviors associated with this eating disorder by emphasizing either its cognitive components—particularly false beliefs related to the denial of the patient’s actual conditions—or its affective components, such as the intense fear of gaining weight. I will argue that neither approach is sufficient to fully capture the complexity of Anorexia Nervosa. This paper explores a more comprehensive approach that goes beyond the cognition-affect dichotomy, aligning better with the DSM-5 criteria for Anorexia Nervosa. These criteria suggest that while both affective and cognitive components play significant roles, neither the cognitive element nor the affective element is necessary or sufficient to define the condition on its own. I propose that this can be achieved by drawing an analogy with addiction, where both conditions can be seen as stemming from and maintained by an all-consuming fixation that permeates individuals’ lives and profoundly influences their behaviors. In Anorexia Nervosa, this fixation manifests as a pervasive preoccupation with body size and weight. What distinguishes these behaviors is their internal self-endorsement, aligning with the well-documented ego-syntonic nature of Anorexia Nervosa: sufferers perceive these behaviors as consistent with their feelings, values, and ideals, making them resistant to change. Understanding Anorexia Nervosa within the framework of addiction, particularly by recognizing the pivotal role of ego-syntonic fixation, allows for a more comprehensive approach to the disorder that sheds light on its high resistance to treatment and the challenges faced in clinical interventions.

The consensus among philosophers is that indirect control is the only plausible type of control that individuals can exercise over implicit bias. By contrast, direct control over implicit bias is dismissed as implausible. It is dismissed on two grounds. First, direct control is susceptible to the rebound effect. Second, the nature of implicit bias belies direct control. This paper grates against the prevailing philosophical consensus by defending direct control against its dismissal. Accordingly, I argue that the rebound effect is not a knock-down-drag-out phenomenon against direct control. I further argue that philosophers have an unnuanced view of the rebound effect and represent it in ways that betray inaccuracies. I argue that this opens up some space to develop a moderate view of direct control over implicit bias. The view I develop is rooted in dual-system theory and the findings of experimental social psychology and neuroscience. Taken together, the evidence suggests two things: (1) the nature of implicit bias does not always belie direct control, and (2) that a moderate type of direct control over implicit bias is plausible. I end with a caution against treating indirect control as the standard-bearer for control over implicit bias. Indirect control is secured by undertaking control-based intervention techniques. But evidence suggests that the effects of these techniques fade over time. I do not suggest, however, that indirect control be jettisoned. Instead, I propose that it be used as a strategy along with moderate direct control such that no ameliorative avenue is foreclosed.

According to Aesthetic Empiricism, only the features of artworks accessible by sensory perception can be aesthetically relevant. In other words, aesthetic properties supervene on perceptual properties. Although commonly accepted in early analytic aesthetics, Aesthetic Empiricism has been the target of a number of thought experiments popularized by Gombrich, Walton, and Levinson, purporting to show that perceptually indiscernible artworks may differ aesthetically. In particular, this literature exploits three kinds of differences among perceptually indiscernible artworks that may account for aesthetic differences: relative to categories of art, historical provenance, or means of production. Like in all philosophical thought experiments, the reliability of the elicited intuitions remains an empirical question that we address here with the methods of experimental philosophy. Throughout three studies, we show that most people do not believe that non-perceptual properties can modulate our evaluation of an artwork’s beauty. However, intuitions were much more divided when considering expressive aesthetic properties (such as intensity), and even clearly reversed when considering artistic properties (such as originality or technical achievement). Overall, our studies show that the central intuitions elicited by the classical indiscernibility arguments strongly depend on the class of manipulated properties (expressive aesthetic properties vs formal aesthetic properties; aesthetic properties vs artistic properties) and are thus more suited to refute artistic empiricism than aesthetic empiricism, narrowly construed.

In amodal completion the mind in some sense completes the visual perceptual representation of a scene by representing parts of the scene hidden behind other objects. Cognitive science has had a lot to say about how amodal completion occurs but has had little to say about the format of the representations involved and the way in which they represent. Some philosophers hold that amodal completions take the form of sensory imaginings of the occluded portions. This theory poses a puzzle for both philosophy and neuroscience about how the occluded parts are imagined to be located relative to the unoccluded parts. A better theory begins with the observation that for many purposes it is useful to suppose that the mind contains mental models of three-dimensional structure. Visual perceptions and mental images may be conceived as mental models that represent external scenes by virtue of homomorphism and which possess both a deep aspect, representing both visible and occluded three-dimensional structure, and a perspectival aspect, representing only an arrangement of visible surfaces. In these terms we can explain various problem-solving abilities, such as the ability to imagine what a scene will look like from another point of view. Amodal completions can be treated as deep perceptual representations of three-dimensional structure. Thus amodal completions do not consist of mental imagery, but they can be used to generate mental imagery representing how a scene would look from alternative points of view.

Conspiracy theories abound in social and political discourse, believed by millions of people around the world. In this article, we highlight when it is important to engage with people who believe in conspiracy theories and review recent literature highlighting how best to do so. We first summarise research on the potentially damaging consequences of conspiracy beliefs for individuals, including consequences related to psychopathology. We also focus on the consequences for groups, and societies, and the importance of understanding and addressing conspiracy beliefs. We then review recent literature on how to engage with people who believe in conspiracy theories, specifically with the goal to reduce susceptibility to conspiracy theories and other types of misinformation. We focus on interpersonal strategies to communicate with individuals who believe in conspiracy theories, and large-scale strategies designed to reduce conspiracy beliefs within broader communities.